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Introduction
This monograph assesses the achievements of the European Union in the
field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and analyses the pro’s and con’s
of setting up of an area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ). To what
extent has a balance been struck between these three dimensions or has
priority been given to one or another over the others? The questions we
are asking in this survey of EU Justice and Home Affairs policies have
many different answers depending on one’s professional, national and
cultural background and where one is located in the kaleidoscope of
interests and political traditions that make up the European Union and its
member states. As researchers wishing to make the European institutions
work better and to see the interests of ordinary citizens and residents of
the EU taken into account and their rights better defended, we offer one
possible set of answers. Our remarks are therefore addressed to policy-
makers as well as policy analysts at all levels of European and national
institutions, as we try to clarify an increasingly complex and difficult
area, avoiding the use of jargon and excessive references to the literature
and official documents.
What is wrong with JHA on the eve of enlargement? The defects are
obvious and easy to specify. The decision-making processes are
inefficient; policies agreed are often ineffective because they are not
adequately implemented; there is excessive complexity of programmes
and cooperative arrangements; and the EU suffers from weak legitimacy
in this area making the cooperation of governments and citizens less than
reliable. Member states are ambivalent, pushing for measures and then
failing to implement them. The sorry record of third pillar Conventions –
only one ratified and implemented out of the 25 negotiated – is a graphic
illustration of this point. When the solution of a problem is entirely in
their hands – such as the supply of criminal intelligence to Europol – they
do not live up to their commitments.ANDERSON & APAP
2
Yet the achievements are important and should be underlined. The EU
adopted an ambitious and comprehensive work programme at Tampere in
1999, which balanced the desire for security with the equally important
requirement of defending liberty. It also outlined a timetable – the famous
Tampere scoreboard – that set deadlines and also gave structure to the
agenda in this area. This scoreboard can also be notoriously vulnerable to
political shocks. Despite the inefficiency of the decision-making process,
the EU has shown after 11 September that it can take radical decisions
quickly. Above all, the European Commission accepted important new
responsibilities in this area, with a minimum of disruption, and has done
its work well. A stream of high-quality drafts have been produced in
sensitive areas, such as immigration, asylum, mutual recognition, police
and judicial cooperation, which almost always are of higher quality than
the proposals made by the member states.
From the point of view of the citizen and the resident of the EU, the view
is less clear. What is going on and who is responsible for what is, even
for the well informed, shrouded in obscurity. The defence of individual
rights in the face of the emerging system of police and judicial
cooperation appears weak and at times non-existent. Parliamentary
control of the system, at the European and national levels, seems
derisory. This is reflected in the ambivalence of the public reactions
reported by Eurobarometer polls recording emphatic support for “more
Europe” in the fight against serious crime, terrorism, drug-trafficking and
fraud but much weaker support for more police and judicial cooperation.
There is clearly support for cooperative action against certain perceived
evils but much less enthusiasm for assigning more powers to “Brussels”.
From the individual’s point of view, there seems to be more emphasis on
security than freedom, on repressive measures than on defending
liberties, on restrictive rather than progressive measures and negative
integration (reducing barriers to police and judicial cooperation) rather
than positive integration (centred around a programme aimed at reducing
risks and promoting safety). From the perspective of non-EU citizens
residing in the EU, asylum-seekers and undocumented immigrants, the
picture is even bleaker, with little progress having been achieved on a
genuine common asylum regime, a common immigration policy and
legislation approximating the rights of long-term non-EU residents to
those of EU citizens. The Commission has prepared the ground, but the
member states have not followed through.
The record is therefore mixed as the EU moves towards the challenge of
the next enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. Enlargement carries
with it both risks and benefits. The former include the increase in theFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
3
number of legitimate national interests, making agreement on common
policies more difficult; the greater effort that has to be devoted to creating
trust and solidarity across more countries; increased opportunities for
organised crime in a larger market; and potentially greater mobility of
criminals and prostitutes from poorer to richer members of the EU. But it
is important that the perception of risks does not outweigh the benefits to
all of the extension of the area of freedom, security and justice. As was
famously said of the nation state that it “extended the area in which
homicide was a crime”, the benefits of the effective repression of crime
and the extension of rights over a wider area cannot be overestimated.
This study analyses the extent to which progress has been made in JHA
and how certain frictions and strains between member states have
affected the implementation of policy as well as how these may be further
exacerbated by the forthcoming enlargement. It examines the relationship
between supranational and national institutions and the sharing of
competences between them. We evaluate the extent to which the JHA
agenda has been shaped by “events” and policy spillover. Our analysis
leads to policy recommendations to promote trust, flexibility, cooperation
and efficiency (the four concepts elaborated in Chapter 2). These
proposals concern policy implementation and the sharing of competences
between institutions in a sufficiently flexible manner as to provide
responses to events without distorting the finely tuned balance between
freedom, security and justice first established by the European Council in
Tampere in October 1999.4
CHAPTER 1
CHANGES IN CONCEPTS OF SECURITY
AND THE JHA AGENDA
oncepts of security are all based on fear of actual and potential
attacks on public authorities, persons and property. The differences
arise over what constitutes an attack and the direction from which
potential dangers come. Two general changes in conceptions of security
are evident over the past decade and a half. First, as the threat of
conventional military attack on Western Europe has declined with the
collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been a blurring of the distinction
between internal and external security. This constitutes a radical change
because, since the 17th century, the two were regarded as conceptually
distinct – the external threat was that of invasion by a hostile power
whilst the internal threat was subversion and threats to public order. The
ever-increasing internationalisation of economic and social processes has
blurred the traditional distinction between internal and external security
worldwide. Nevertheless, the linkage between internal and external
security fields lies at the core of the redefinition of the West European
security. Criminal threats, including terrorism, are seen as security
threats, which have both internal and external dimensions and need to be
treated together. The European Heads of State and Government
recognised this explicitly in the Tampere Presidency Conclusions.
Before the evaluation of recent developments and setting out of proposals
in Justice and Home Affairs, two background matters should be
considered. The first is the re-conceptualisation of security in recent
years; the collapse of Soviet communism, increasing global integration
and the events of September 11th have each produced radical changes in
attitudes. These changing ideas about security have had, and continue to
have, a powerful influence over the Justice and Home Affairs agenda.
The first moves towards JHA cooperation – the Trevi group, ministerial
meetings, Schengen and Chancellor Kohl's call for a European FBI –
were all motivated by internal security concerns. Secondly, the late 1990s
saw a re-balancing in the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Tampere
Presidency Conclusions with a new emphasis on freedom and justice, in
order to legitimise the growing influence of the EU in this field.
However, security concerns and crime fighting remain the determining
factors driving policy. But the setting of the JHA agenda is not a
straightforward reflection of ideas about security – it is a much more
complex matter – and therefore the two should be considered separately.
CFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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I
Security, like freedom or equality, is a controversial concept. The various
meanings attributed to it are not merely the consequence of different
political commitments and beliefs of individuals along a Right/Left
spectrum. Notions of security are also influenced by broad cultural,
political as well as socio-economic factors. We are therefore dealing with
a very complex pattern of beliefs and perceptions, about which
generalisations are hazardous.
Although, historically, it was believed that internal and external security
policies required coordination, nowadays we see three reasons why we
need to rethink this approach:
First, the European Council underlines that all competences and
instruments at the disposal of the Union, and in particular, in external
relations must be used in an integrated and consistent way to build the
area of freedom, security and justice. Justice and Home Affairs concerns
must be integrated in the definition and implementation of other Union
policies and activities.
Second, some political and law enforcement policy-makers as well as
policy analysts developed, from the early 1990s, the idea of a security
continuum which makes connections between general categories of
illegal activities: terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime, trans-
frontier crime, illegal immigration, asylum-seekers and minority ethnic
groups. It is associated with a broadening of the scope of security issues
to include societal security – threats to the society, economy, culture and
environment. This idea of a security continuum, although useful in
certain types of intelligence analysis, has been sharply criticised, by
Didier Bigo and others, for linking very different activities, profiling of
groups and criminalising illegal immigrants. It also risks impoverishing
the policy debate by categorising difficult problems as security issues too
quickly and too emphatically.
Third, strategies of change in the tasks, functions and organisation of
police, immigration services, customs and intelligence services have been
related to the first two as well as to technical innovation (particularly in
communications and data storage), and are accelerated by changes in
security priorities under the pressure of events, such as, most
dramatically, the terrorist attacks in the United States of September 2001.
Threat analysis has led to the growing importance of strategic
intelligence, the entry of intelligence services into domains previously
regarded as the preserve of the police, and problems of definition of roles
and coordination of police agencies. It also provides the opportunity of anANDERSON & APAP
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enhanced role for international and European organisations in strategic
intelligence-gathering and coordination of investigations of trans-border
criminal activities.
The reflection of these changing conceptions is that two parallel
processes of Europeanisation and externalisation of internal security have
got under way.
The major features of Europeanisation are now familiar. During the
1980s, the Schengen Agreement (signed in 1985 and followed, in 1990,
by the implementation Convention) and the Single European Act (1986)
accelerated the transformation of the European Community into a unified
space, where freedom of circulation is the rule and restrictions to it, the
exception. Lifting controls and restrictions to intra-European circulation
of capital, goods and persons would create – it was said – new
opportunities for criminal and other forms of illegal activities. Internal
security risks, previously tackled at the national level, bounded by
psychologically reassuring state borders, came to be regarded as a
legitimate field for European cooperation. The third pillar of Maastricht
(almost exclusively regarded as a sphere of law enforcement cooperation)
and the area of freedom, justice and security of the Treaty of Amsterdam
were the result. Justice and Home Affairs has been, since 1999, the most
dynamic area of activity of the EU.
The process of externalisation of internal security was triggered by the
perceived requirements of globalisation – especially the opportunities
provided by improvements in transport and communications
technologies, the collapse of law enforcement systems and the emergence
of criminal organisations in the former communist countries, engaged in
drug trafficking, money laundering, people smuggling, car theft, etc.;
irregular/undocumented/ illegal migration often perceived as a security
threat with non-European sources; terrorism, and particular its latest
manifestation – Al Qaeda – provided a particularly dramatic stimulus.
Externalisation of internal security issues created an incentive for national
law enforcement agencies, whose activities had been exclusively
concentrated within national borders, to devote an increasing proportion
of their institutional and operational efforts to the international arena. It
has also provided a crucial legitimising argument for European initiatives
– Schengen, OLAF, Europol (especially, in current circumstances, its
anti-terrorist unit), EU JHA action plan for Ukraine, agreement with
Russia on organised crime and common measures with the US on
counter-terrorism are the best-known examples. The Europeanisation and
the externalisation of internal security have had a major impact on
structures, methods and content of the policy-making process in the fieldFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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of JHA. It has caused some problems and generated an increased
overlapping of, and occasionally open competition between, the policy
communities and agencies traditionally entrusted with external security.
It is perceived that the terrorist attacks of September 11
th have radically
changed perceptions of security – the world after that date is a very
different place. As time passes, this judgement will probably be modified
and qualified, but there can be little doubt that these attacks provided a
new impetus for the development of the area of freedom, justice and
security. This is graphically illustrated by the landmark decisions of the
European arrest warrant, the common position on terrorism, mutual
recognition of judicial orders for the transfer of evidence and the seizure
of assets. The member state governments, security agencies and public
opinion have been made dramatically aware of the extent to which
international forms of crime, which can only be met effectively through
common action, threaten traditional internal security and the AFSJ
provides the framework for such action. However, the problem of balance
between security (strengthening controls on persons and their activities,
improved surveillance, intrusive investigative procedures) and freedom
(civil liberties, procedural rights of suspects, rights for non-EU nationals,
treatment of immigration and asylum cases, even freedom of speech) has
been made more acute.
There is a risk of the security rationale becoming predominant. The
decisions adopted by the Council in the six months after September 11
th
were essentially a security package combining various law enforcement
and criminal justice cooperation measures. There has been a spillover of
the security rationale of the second pillar into JHA areas extending
beyond strictly those of law enforcement against terrorism. An example is
paragraph 29 of the Conclusions adopted by the Council on 20 September
2001, which invites the Commission to examine, as a matter of urgency,
the relationship between safeguarding internal security and complying
with international protection obligations and instruments which – put in
less covert words – means a re-examination of asylum and refugee
guarantees and procedures in the light of the terrorist threat. The anti-
terrorist security package has also almost entirely taken over the agenda
of the JHA Council meetings since September 11th, with the effect that
other areas – such as judicial cooperation in civil matters, which is a
crucial element in the construction of an area of justice – have been
pushed down the agenda.
The Conclusions of 20 September 2002 abound with restrictive measures,
such as utmost vigilance in the issuing of residence permits, the
immediate strengthening of surveillance measures under Art. 2.3 of theANDERSON & APAP
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Schengen Convention and more systematic checking of identity papers
(paragraphs 24 and 25). The Council has also committed itself to a
particular effort to strike a balance between the protection of personal
data and the need of law enforcement authorities to gain access to data for
criminal investigation purposes (paragraph 4). The context leaves little
doubt that this balance is likely to make more rather than less personal
data available to law enforcement authorities.
Democratic control may also be weakened; parliaments have been given
little time and, in some cases, no authority to examine the security
package agreed by the Council. The decision to provide the European
Parliament with an annual report on the terrorism situation and trends (to
be entitled TE-SAT) cannot be regarded as a sufficient guarantee of
effective parliamentary control of cooperation arrangements and
structures between law enforcement authorities such as the meetings
between the heads of counter-terrorist units (the first took place on 15
October 2001), the projected missions entrusted to counter-terrorist
specialists and the drawing up of a common list of terrorist organisations.
In Council texts, no mention is made of any parliamentary scrutiny – at
the national or European level – of the regular meetings of the heads of
the intelligence services (the first of which took place on 11 October).
Several new forms of inter-agency cooperation – such as the joint
investigation teams consisting of police officers, specialised magistrates,
Eurojust and Europol representatives referred to in paragraph 2 of the
Conclusions of 20 September – will also not be easily monitored by
parliaments because EU governments have so far tended to treat inter-
agency cooperation as a purely operational matter.
The balance between necessary confidentiality and desirable transparency
is unlikely to be decided in favour of the latter. Cooperation in the fight
against terrorism – ever since its origins in the context of the TREVI
framework of the mid-1970s – has always been considered as particularly
sensitive and therefore secret. The involvement of national intelligence
services – the least transparent part, despite recent changes, of national
government structures – will not help. However, the Council has made
public all the main elements of the post-September 11
th security package,
which has provoked comment in the media and reactions from civil
liberties groups.
Over-optimism, much in evidence in the last quarter of 2001, about both
the stability of the anti-terrorist alliance and the consensus on the priority
to be given to the fight against terrorism, should be avoided. Improved
international cooperation to counter terrorism has often emerged as a
priority on the international agenda in the last three decades. It proved toFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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be an elusive goal. Since the early 1970s, the industrialised nations have
repeatedly returned to the theme with repeated lack of success. Prior to
2001, counter-terrorism was a dubious basis for systematic police and
judicial cooperation, for a variety of reasons:
•  First terrorism is usually directed towards influencing state policy
and therefore represents an issue of state security (necessarily a
secret domain), rather than ordinary policing.
•  Second, since political causes and interests are involved,
governments usually have widely differing perspectives on the
implications, importance and potential effects of particular terrorist
incidents.
•  Third, a wide variety of agencies (see Annex 2) – both police and
intelligence services – are involved in countering terrorism and
coordination between them within states is highly problematic:
different agencies often have different interests in international
cooperation, and conflicts between them over resources,
competences and territory are common.
•  Fourth, political violence linked to broadly based political
movements cannot be repressed by police action alone but requires a
mix of policies aimed at removing the underlying conditions that
provoke violence; governments do not have the same priorities or
the same level of commitment in these policies.
•  Fifth, although acts of terror have a dramatic impact on public
opinion, these are relatively rare compared with ordinary criminality,
and long periods can pass without countries experiencing any
incident; this weakens the day-to-day commitment of police
agencies faced by other pressing problems.
These reasons have been obscured by the events of September 11
th, but
they are still present. Those events have radically altered the international
climate but there are grounds for pessimism about the permanence of the
change. The war on terrorism will probably prove to be, like the war on
drugs, a conflict that cannot be won. The extraordinarily broad
international support for the US may not be very deep.
II
The processes by which JHA policies are formed involve a wide range of
institutions and political forces. These processes – how the agenda is set,
the proposal of alternative solutions to problems, choices between these
alternatives, the arrival at authoritative decisions and the implementationANDERSON & APAP
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of these decisions – are difficult to grasp in their entirety, even for those
directly involved. Yet the outcome must be clear and easily
communicated not only to those professionally involved (administrators,
magistrates, judges, lawyers, police and non-governmental organisations)
but also to broad sections of opinion in the member states. Without this
quality of communicability, the risks of policy failure are high and the
general reputation of the EU put at risk.
The two crucial stages in terms of establishing the legitimacy of the EU’s
role in this area are the first – agenda-setting – and the last –
implementation. It is essential that a wide range of individuals and groups
can contribute ideas and views at the initial stage of policy formation. It
is equally essential that the policy finally decided works and can be
understood and supported by those whom it affects. The deliberative and
decision-making stages by the authoritative institutions (Council,
Commission and Parliament) must, of course, be accepted as legitimate
but the first and the last stages are crucial in underpinning the
constitutional, political and social legitimacy of the EU.
It is therefore worth setting out some ideas about these two stages,
agenda-setting and implementation, as a preamble to our analysis of the
substance of policy.
The term agenda is used in different ways depending upon the context.
An agenda is used to refer to a list of topics to be discussed at a meeting;
it is also used to refer to a plan or scheme someone wishes others to
adopt, as in the phrase a hidden agenda. It is frequently used to denote a
coherent list of proposals or action points, as in the reference to the
Tampere agenda. In the context with which we are concerned, it is most
usefully applied to the subjects or problems to which governments, EU
officials, parliamentarians and those closely associated with them in
professional groups, the media and research community (often
collectively called the policy community) are paying serious attention.
The agenda-setting process narrows the set of conceivable topics that is
taken seriously.
There is of course the grand agenda, which involves Heads of State and
Government, usually the setting of general goals and objectives, but
European Council meetings also can, and do, discuss contentious matters
of detail. In addition, there is the agenda involved in the preparation of
detailed proposals – both at the level that requires political (ministerial)
intervention and at the official level (involving both EU officials and
national government civil servants). In the latter case, the list of topics on
the agenda varies from one part of the official (EU and governmental)
machine to another.FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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There is always a suspicion that the third level operates as an effective
gatekeeper for the other two levels, determining what is considered
feasible and what is not. This is why the debate on the agenda, and the
participants in this debate, should be kept as open and transparent as
possible at all levels. The narrowing of the proposals and ideas from the
conceivable to those that become the focus of real attention is always
controversial and controversy should not be avoided. This is a necessary
part of building trust in the EU's role in this delicate area of policy. This
is not an easy pre-condition to fulfil because traditionally the internal
security establishment – police, magistrates, officials of ministries of
Justice and the Interior – have been used to working under a cloak of
confidentiality. However, processes of Europeanisation are effecting a
change in this longstanding customary practice.
The agenda-setting in JHA changed substantially as a result of the
Tampere Presidency Conclusions because they provided a framework for
taking decisions, with a timetable and a scoreboard for publicising
whether the timetable was being adhered to. In other words, the member
state holding the EU Presidency became less important in influencing the
agenda; priorities could not be changed so easily from one Presidency to
the next depending on the priorities of particular member states. There
remains room for some manoeuvre for the Presidency but now a “good
Presidency” is regarded as one that keeps up the momentum on the
Tampere agenda.
In general, there are four main ways in which the agenda in JHA may be
shifted:
•  International crises can change priorities. Depending on their nature
and given the tendency towards overlap or fusion of internal and
external security, these may not always have negative effects on the
development of JHA policy. Indeed before September 11
th, there is
evidence that progress in JHA was lagging behind the scoreboard
expectations. Those events gave an essential impetus to the
European Arrest Warrant and the Common Position on Terrorism,
which might otherwise have been hamstrung by reservations by
member states. The risk in this case is that the agenda could become
unbalanced with greater emphasis on security and less on the
protection of individual rights.
•  The demands of other policy areas for attention can remove the
whole or part of JHA as a primary focus of interest for EU policy-
makers. This has not yet happened in the brief period that has
elapsed since the adoption of the Tampere programme becauseANDERSON & APAP
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security and immigration remain important issues for member states
in the electoral arena. However, if there is major turbulence in
another area over, for example, agriculture in the coming
enlargement, it is easy to imagine this happening.
•  New policy ideas can emerge in the forefront of debate. One
plausible scenario is that sharp differences arise over penal policy,
for example in drug control, between member states, which could
contaminate the whole of police and judicial cooperation. Again,
new policy ideas can have positive effects, making issues previously
considered complicated and technically difficult much more
straightforward and easier to resolve. This may be particularly the
case in legal harmonisation or the approximation in matters such as
fraud.
•  Problems can arise in policy implementation. This can result in a
breakdown of trust if, for example, corruption is present in the police
and judicial systems in one or more member states that affects the
interests of citizens of other member states, this could easily change
the level of integration and cooperation thought feasible in JHA.
This is an extreme example of many problems that can arise at the
implementation stage – most of the problems could arise if law
enforcement authorities considered that EU policies were either
irrelevant or involved the wrong priorities in the allocation of
resources.
In the next chapter we propose four concepts of trust, flexibility,
coordination and efficiency to be used as tools to evaluate the JHA
agenda and problems in its implementation. We also analyse potential
sources of tension between the competent institutions and agencies and
how these affect decision-making in this area and the interaction between
national and supranational levels.13
CHAPTER 2
REQUIREMENTS OF EFFECTIVE JHA POLICIES
ood policy-making in JHA requires that decision-makers are given
a clear mandate and that those agencies charged with policy
implementation are well managed.
It should be clear to the public and to professional groups affected by the
policies who does what, who is responsible and where the lines of
accountability are drawn. At the most general level, the provision of a
clear mandate is a constitutional question. The present pillar structure of
the EU is unsatisfactory and unclear. It should be replaced in the
proposals for the next inter-governmental conference by a simple division
of powers – those reserved to the EU, those remaining exclusively with
the member states and those shared by the EU and the member states. We
return to these issues in Chapter 5.
A well managed system depends on the presence of high levels of trust,
adequate flexibility, good coordination and efficiency in terms of cost and
rapidity of response to requests for information and cooperation. These
concepts are also basic to assessing convergence and divergence between
member states in Justice and Home Affairs. They require refinement and
re-definition in order to be applicable to specific policy concerns in this
policy area. They also help to provide the analytical tools needed for
introducing greater clarity in the policy discussions. Despite the
complexity of the intellectual debates devoted to these concepts,
communicating some ideas from these debates, in language accessible to
policy-makers, is overdue.
2.1 Context
Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, a policy area once considered
to be only slowly evolving in the direction of Europeanisation, has
recently become one of the most dynamic policy domains in the EU. The
1999 Tampere European Council provided the necessary political boost
for intensifying collaboration among member states on immigration and
asylum policy as well as police and judicial cooperation. The European
Commission was given a mandate, to be shared with the member states,
by the Treaty of Amsterdam to make proposals for translating the broad
political objectives outlined in the Treaty into specific policy measures.
As emphasised in Chapter 1, the events of September11
th, followed by
increasing public concern over illegal immigration, strengthened the
political resolve of the member states to overcome differences and
proceed faster with the implementation of common initiatives.
GANDERSON & APAP
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After the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May 1999, the
fields of “visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free
movement of persons” came under the first pillar, within the competence
of European Community law, under Title IV of the EC Treaty (Arts 61-
69). Although decisions must be taken unanimously during a transition
period, they have direct effect in the member states. Public order and
internal security – policing and judicial cooperation – remain in the third
pillar, governed by an intergovernmental method, but with modifications
to make decision-making more efficient. An area of freedom, security
and justice is to be implemented in the five-year period following the
entry into force of the Treaty (1999-2004).
Despite the peculiarities of the present institutional structure of the EU
(JHA are present in three pillars), policies falling under the rubric of
Justice and Home Affairs are not arbitrarily grouped together. They have
important inter-connections, and changes in one policy can have
consequential effects on other policies. However, they are usually
analysed separately (for a valuable exception, see Monar, 2000) by
specialists in different disciplines – lawyers, political scientists,
sociologists, economists – or through multi-disciplinary approaches in
particular areas such as immigration, police studies, approximation of
laws or the constitutional and institutional architecture of the EU. There
is already a considerable literature on police cooperation, border checks,
immigration control, free movement, Eurojust and the approximation of
laws in criminal matters, but this is either firmly within the confines of
particular disciplines or is only an ephemeral contribution to the
continuing policy debate. This fragmentation would change, if there were
greater constitutional clarity in the EU.
At the same time as creating an area of “freedom, security and justice”,
the EU has announced the firm intention to accept new members. This
enlargement of the EU will increase the cultural, social and economic
diversity of the Union and place strains on its decision-making processes.
The eastern enlargement of the EU is the first enlargement that involves
to a significant extent Justice and Home Affairs cooperation.
Furthermore, this is occurring at a critical moment for the implementation
of new initiatives at European level. The coincidence of these
developments poses a major challenge for member states, which are now
confronted with the necessity to strengthen collaboration among
themselves and at the same time incorporate new members in the EU
decision-making structures, making agreement on common actions
potentially more difficult.FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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Cooperation in JHA differs from other policy areas (with minor
exceptions) in the EU because it involves continuing and increasingly
intensive cooperation between government agencies in the member states
and entails policy convergence and approximation of laws. It is a
particularly difficult form of cooperation because of sensitivities about
sovereignty and the diversity in the legal systems of the member states
(and of the candidate countries).
2.2 Making the system work
Inadequate levels of trust, inflexibility, poor coordination and
inefficiencies in terms of poor value for money and a slow operation of
systems can lead to serious friction between member states or provoke
hostility from sections of public opinion towards the European Union. In
order to tackle these difficult practical problems, a common language is
essential. Conceptual clarification is the  sine qua non  of good
management in this area.
2.3 The concept of trust
Trust is the most difficult of these concepts and widely differing opinions
co-exist concerning the basis of trust. Its meaning has been widely
debated in philosophy and the social sciences since Emile Durkheim,
(particularly his writings on education, professional ethics, individualism
and socialism). More recently, it has been important in discussions of
social capital. Social theorists do not agree on whether it is a property of
individuals, social relationships or social systems.
Trust is a crucially important quality in the relations between individuals
who are members of the same family, live in the same locality, are
members of the same professional group or organisation, have market
relationships or who are the members of the same national society.
According to the political analyst Niklas Luhman (1979), “Without trust
only very simple forms of human cooperation, which can be transacted
on the spot, are possible”. Trust is essential for maintaining stable
relationships and is vital for the maintenance of cooperation.
Trust can be seen as a mechanism for solving collective action problems
because cooperation based on trust exists irrespective of sanctions and
rewards. Trust rests on beliefs about people reacting or not reacting in
certain ways; it requires reciprocity and moral obligation that exist to the
extent that individuals share values and norms. The utilitarian approach in
which trust is established by the self-interested actions of rational
individuals is unsatisfactory. Cooperation based on a rational calculation
of costs and benefits cannot go beyond the specific short-term objectivesANDERSON & APAP
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that bring the parties together. A “culture of trust” should be the basis of
EU-wide cooperation in JHA.
Also central to this policy area is the idea that trust underpins the debate
on the ‘risk society’ – and an assessment of risk is now at the core of
planning internal security policies. In particular, the changing nature of
risk and its implications for contemporary politics and society have
become important topics of debate in the social sciences. Modernisation
has produced unintended risks (see Beck, 1998, and Giddens, 1998),
which are now a primary preoccupation of citizens and policy-makers.
Awareness of and anxiety about risk have become ubiquitous in
contemporary society and are the outcome of processes of scientific and
technological development. “Manufactured uncertainty” has penetrated
everyone's life as most human activities have grown to involve seemingly
incalculable risks. As a consequence, political debate has been
transformed with the management of risk increasingly at its centre.
These changes, while presenting difficult challenges to policy-makers,
offer opportunities as well. High levels of insecurity in the risk society
encourage the crossing of bridges between people, cultures, nations and
the building of trust in search of better control of risk. The notion of trust,
therefore, becomes essential to any policy effort intended to create
security in a risk society. This does not mean just a shift in the discourse
on safety provision but a radical departure in the way actors engage in
policy-making and collaborate to achieve results. Risk management
requires more profound involvement with counterparts and partners in an
effort to overcome what Beck (1998) refers to as the state of “organised
irresponsibility”.
To take the example of police cooperation, in a society characterised by
“risk abundance”, police agencies are increasingly concerned with
producing knowledge related to risk and communicating it to other
agencies across borders. Information-sharing, therefore, becomes a
critical element of the risk-management system, yet it is not feasible
without adequate levels of trust between actors – irrespective of national
background and functional specialisation.
Yet, belief in the virtues of trust is neither uniformly nor universally
shared. Shared values and norms are often built through institutions that
express common bonds. Institutions can reduce the transaction costs of
exchanges among actors, provide information to governments on the
policy options available, give opportunities for an improved cross-issue
debate and cooperation, as well as create an environment of predictability
and stable expectations about future behaviour. Institutions provide a
benchmark for identity by socialising people so that they have a commonFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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understanding of the policy objectives and the methods of achieving
them. Trust is part of the normative context established through greater
interaction among European states and citizens through working together
in EU institutions.
Despite institutional integration in Europe (in JHA, of very recent origin),
sources of mistrust among the EU member states still exist. In the field of
JHA, examples of mistrust abound and are reminders of the persistent
uncertainties of trust. Visas are expressions of mistrust of third countries
– until the mid-1980s they reflected a mistrust of governments and now
often a mistrust of people. Visas and border controls have recently caused
mistrust between European institutions, illustrated by cases before the
European Court of Justice, and between member states over conditions in
which visas are issued.
A lack of trust is apparent in the relations between EU member states and
applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Apparent double
standards on corruption and organised crime (member states expecting
standards of candidate states that they did not meet themselves) are both a
manifestation and a cause of mistrust. The difficulties that surfaced in the
negotiation and implementation of the Schengen II information system
also revealed a level of distrust of new member states.
In police cooperation, in the vertical information exchange (local-
national-European), there is often a failure to communicate to the higher
level. Further, any evidence of police corruption has a destructive effect
on trust. The criminal law procedures thought necessary in some member
states have had a destructive effect on trust. The use of pre-trial detention
by one state of EU nationals from another was a cause of
misunderstanding that is now being addressed.
Establishing a high level of trust or, to use the Durkheimian term,
“solidarity” in police, judicial, border control and immigration
cooperation cannot be separated from wider issues of building a genuine
European community. If all EU citizens regarded each other in the same
way as they presently regard their fellow countrymen/women, then such a
community could be said to exist. The lack of a genuine ‘European
people’ or demos is a problem in this and other fields of EU activity.
Constitutional and institutional change, the subject of Chapter 5, is a
partial contribution to overcoming this lacuna.
Up-to-date and operationally relevant information requires further
development of well designed databases to give information about
matters such as procedures, legal requirements, operational policies,
police organisation and contact persons. The frustrations of not being ableANDERSON & APAP
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to find quickly the precise information required on databases are well
known. Adequate time is probably the most difficult condition to provide.
Compared with the compelling demands on police time, making space for
trust-building in the European cooperation sphere may seem a nebulous
objective to some professional groups, especially the police.
The EU has already embarked upon a range of measures that could serve
as the basis of a trust-building strategy. There is an ever-present tendency
to ‘re-invent the wheel’. Developing, improving and increasing the
resources, where necessary, of existing programmes and initiatives are
crucial. The first PHARE programme on strengthening drug law
enforcement in the candidate countries is a good model in a particular
respect – police officers are sent out from the member states to advise,
supply information and facilitate exchanges. This has a federating effect
on the member states because they have to present a coordinated front to
the outside world. The OISIN programme, referred to in the next section,
is an even more promising example because it provides for improving
skills, opportunities for working across borders and learning from
experience of joint operations.
If existing JHA arrangements are to operate effectively, especially in an
enlarged EU, higher levels of trust must be established. The particular
reasons for mistrust are likely to change over time, but the task is to
create conditions in which trust is the norm and mistrust the exception. A
strategy for trust-building should ensure adequate resources for police
and magistrates involved in cooperation, in terms of knowledge, skills,
information, and time. The first two require upgrading most countries’
training systems. They depend also on the quality of the general
educational provision in the states particularly for such matters as
language skills and general understanding of the European Union.
2.4 The concept of flexibility
The literature utilising the concept of flexibility is extremely diverse.
Flexibility was popularised in the 1980s by economists and specialists in
industrial relations in studies of the labour market. In the 1990s, there
was an application of the concept in policy studies, particularly in the
international arena (Davis and Finch, 1993, Jackson et al., 2001). In
government and administration, the idea of flexibility is central to the
‘new public management’ literature, particularly in arguments in favour
of flexibility towards client demands (for police, see Walker, 2001). The
most recent use of the idea has been to the European Union itself after the
negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam (Búrca and Scott, 2000 and Den
Boer, 1998). A common thread in this body of literature is that flexibilityFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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enables individuals and groups (and even states) to adapt to different and
changing circumstances in order to pursue the same overall objectives.
A distinction may be drawn between “variation” and “flexibility”.
Variations in practice occur without necessarily being noticed or
consciously willed by the people involved. If they are noticed, they are
regarded negatively when they occur in EU measures with direct effect,
for example the persistent variations in French practice over dates of the
hunting season in apparent contradiction with an environmental directive
of 1979. Flexibility, by contrast, may deliberately be introduced into
practices, procedures and behaviours to produce desired outcomes. This
does not imply, as it does in the case of variation, the absence of or non-
compliance with rules. Rules to allow for flexibility are necessary to
regulate when, how and in what way departures from a norm are
permissible.
There are various kinds of flexibility in the EU. The first is constitutional
or treaty-based. Exceptions are extended to particular member states. This
can take two forms – it may allow opt-outs or opt-ins in particular sectors
of policy such as the common currency or border controls; or it may
allow, in the case of enhanced cooperation, a group of states (a minimum
of eight, according to the Treaty of Amsterdam) to integrate more closely
whilst using EU institutions to do so. In the case of EU measures with
direct effect, derogations for particular states are allowed on specific
items when they establish a case that the objectives of the measure would
not be achieved without such an exception being made. In addition, there
is institutional flexibility – the establishment of new machinery or units at
the European, national and local and/or regional levels; new institutional
practices may allow a more open-ended conception of the role of EU
agencies; the use of guidelines in calling for direct cooperation between
agencies in member states rather than of EU law and regulation can
contribute to another layer of flexibility. Finally, there is flexibility in the
area covered by EU systems, that is to say, neighbouring states (e.g. the
Schengen association agreements with Norway and Iceland, and now
with Switzerland) may be co-opted into EU JHA systems.
The most important form of flexibility in the JHA area is flexibility in
implementation of measures. This applies to all instruments used in JHA
(e.g. framework decisions, decisions, common positions,
recommendations, action programmes and conventions), excepting those
(some civil law legislation and all freedom of movement rules) contained
in pillar 1. Member states must, for example, have central offices for the
Schengen system and for cooperation with Europol, but it is at their
discretion how these are staffed, by whom and according to what rules ofANDERSON & APAP
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organisation. The concept of flexibility can be widened to include
multilateral and bilateral agreements, which are common in the law
enforcement area, between member states outside the EU framework and
with third countries.
Almost invariably, flexibility has unintended and frequently negative
consequences. It is potentially in conflict with the other desirable values
discussed in this chapter. It creates greater uncertainty, which can
undermine relations of trust since one of the requirements of trust is
predictable behaviour. Lack of knowledge about how other states are
implementing measures can create serious suspicions about whether they
are implementing them at all. It may undermine systems of coordination
because it allows very different arrangements in the member states for
implementing policies – thus with whom to coordinate becomes
problematic. Efficiency can be reduced because in a complex cultural
area like the EU, flexibility can be interpreted in different ways in
different member states and by different professional groups, leading to
misunderstandings. Also the costs, particularly information costs, are
likely to increase considerably. Flexibility as now practised in the EU
creates a very complex world, raising problems of comprehensibility
even for the well informed.
Nonetheless flexibility is necessary in JHA cooperation in order to
coordinate joint actions, implement policies, adapt to changing
circumstances and take account of variations in local conditions. The
absence of flexibility, namely the attempt to impose common harmonised
standards, would slow down the decision-making process and, in some
sensitive areas, would block it altogether. Also harmonisation could
reduce efficiency in circumstances where there are inevitable variations –
legal, institutional and geopolitical –between member states that ought to
be taken into account.
New machinery or units at the European Union level – Europol,
Schengen, Eurojust, European Police Academy, Police Chiefs Task Force
and OLAF – illustrate the advantages and some of the drawbacks of EU
institutional flexibility. New initiatives will doubtless be proposed from
time to time. The existing initiatives and the possibility of new ones
demonstrates the adaptability of the EU, but once the machinery is in
place they add an element of rigidity to the EU system since they develop
institutional interests in their survival and in the development of their
influence and field of activity. These often co-exist with older forms of
cooperation and communication, established outside the EU framework,
but rationalisation is difficult because of the difficulties of abolishing
institutions or regular practices that have worked reasonably well.FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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A form of flexibility within member states is that a new remit for national
institutions tends to follow, often with some delay, changes at European
or international level. The most commented on has been the partial re-
conversion of security services from espionage or counter-espionage
against other countries to combating international crime and terrorism.
Some changes in remit have been the direct outcome of Europeanisation.
Occasionally they have proven unsuccessful (as the temporary conversion
of the French PAF – Police de l’Air et des Frontières – to the DICCILEC
–  Direction Centrale de la Lutte contre l’Immigration et le Travail
Clandestine), and a step backwards has been taken. The extent to which
change in remit is possible varies across the EU member states. This adds
a new layer of complexity to the effects of flexibility.
New techniques in information and communications technologies often
result in flexibility because they provide new possibilities of data storage,
analysis and transmission. These are diffused quickly but adopted
unevenly across the member states and the candidate states. In certain
areas, police techniques such as finger print searches, DNA testing and
analysis of firearms are more standardised, partly for financial reasons.
Where they are not, the Trevi group had, and now Europol has a
responsibility to disseminate “best practice”, but practical constraints
such as budgets mean that there is large variation in practice. Exactly how
much is not systematically established. The question of what flexibility
(or permissible variation) is desirable has not yet been posed.
Redeployment and re-training of personnel is one of the difficult
preconditions of flexibility of police, magistrates, immigration officials
and personnel of ministries of Justice and the Interior. This is because of
time constraints on these professionals, their conservatism and  esprit de
corps, and certain political blockages. The JHA programme OISIN
addresses mainly the training aspect of the problem. Its objectives are:
- to raise language skills and knowledge of legal and operational
terminology;
- to promote awareness of legislation and operational procedures through
training, exchanges and study visits;
- to organise joint operational projects;
- to organise briefings and debriefings of joint operational projects; and,
- to provide information, training, research, operational studies and
evaluation.
However, the resources (at €3 million) devoted to this programme are
insufficient.ANDERSON & APAP
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The concept of flexibility is an essential tool in managing any complex
system. An assessment of flexibility in the context of JHA policies should
be part of both the quality audit and the monitoring of implementation of
JHA policies, both of which are recommended below.
2.5 The concept of coordination
Coordination can be defined as ‘the actions of separate individuals or
organisations – which are not in pre-existing harmony – [are] brought
into conformity with one another through negotiations’ (Krasner, 1983, p.
1; Keohane, 1984, p. 51). There are two types of coordination, which are
analytically distinct though inseparable in practice – political
coordination and administrative/managerial coordination. Until the
present time, the former has been incommensurably more important in
JHA, because most policies agreed had the character of guidelines. It
remained the exclusive responsibility of the member states to implement
them, thus avoiding issues of administrative/managerial coordination at
the EU level. With the establishment of Schengen, Europol, Eurojust and
the European Police Academy, together with the more informal but
continuing arrangements such as the European Judicial Network and the
Working Group of Chiefs of Police, managerial coordination within and
between these entities will assume an ever-increasing importance.
In the JHA field, policy coordination fluctuates over time as the interests
and loyalties of the main actors shift. The analytical framework provided
by the “pendulum model” proposed by Wallace (1996, p. 13) is useful in
understanding this fluctuation (see Figure 1). Helen Wallace uses the
metaphor of a pendulum oscillating between two magnetic fields, one
nationally based and the other one  transnationally/supranationally-
oriented. The transnational policy arena is located in the European
institutions, whereas at the national level, governance is performed by the
member state, although in some west European countries there exist also
minor magnetic fields at regional and local levels. The probability of
adoption of national or transnational policies depends on the relative
strength of the magnetic fields. If both sides are weak, then no coherent
policy will emerge either at transnational or at national level. The
movement of the pendulum encapsulates the process of European
integration: at times it is regular, and irregular at other times; at times it
oscillates, and in some instances it remains stationary.
The model is based on three premises:
•  European states are politically inadequate;
•  globalisation has a significant impact; and,
•  the European region has specific features.FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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Figure 1. Shifts in interests between national and supranational levels in
the EU
Source: Wallace (1996, p. 13).
Choices between national policy and various forms of transnational
collaboration are subject to political competition, and are thus inherently
unstable. An example is in immigration policy: member states have very
different expectations and traditions with regard to this issue and wish to
control it, but pressures and incentives accumulate for strengthening
collective European action, giving the transnational field at least a
temporary advantage. But this model suggests that neither field will win a
permanent and decisive victory. For example, notwithstanding the
common challenges relating to policy towards resident third-country
nationals in the EU and immigration, policies in the various EU member
states remained, and, to a certain extent, still are different one from
another. In this and other fields, evolving arrangements are conceived asANDERSON & APAP
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a set of similar policies, so that national sovereignty and prerogatives
need not be infringed. As one Commission official put it, “a great deal of
time [is] spent negotiating legal texts which [are] later watered down to
carry as little legal obligation as possible to ensure they are acceptable to
all Member States”.
Thus, Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty confirmed intergovernmental
cooperation as the proper way to deal with JHA matters. In addition, the
Treaty failed to define whether the aim of Justice and Home Affairs
cooperation was to provide for and/or encourage legal initiatives, or
rather to develop a practical, operational cooperation (Den Boer, 1996).
Its economic provisions increased pressure towards collective European
measures in other fields, creating conditions for further integration in
JHA. To borrow Helen Wallace's words, this allowed “ideas and interests
[to become] congruent and shared across borders and hence mutually
compatible and reinforcing” (Wallace, 1996). The potential for policies at
a transnational level was embodied in the Treaty of Amsterdam, but this
was the case only with regard to some issues. The Tampere Conclusions
and the accompanying ‘scoreboard’, together with the Commission’s
right of initiative in the JHA area, are important new instruments of
policy coordination. But they are far from settling the issue: the
pendulum between state-centred and European-level solutions is likely to
swing for some time yet.
In terms of administrative and managerial coordination, the EU level is in
a peculiar position because it lacks most of the means of coordination
available in national administrations, or possesses them only in a weak
form. According to Ernest R. Alexander (1995, p. 1), who adopts a
rational choice approach, “for an organisation to agree to participate in a
coordinated effort, the prospective rewards of inter-organisational
cooperation must be greater than its costs, risk or threat to the
organisation or relevant vested interest within it”. The state can
manipulate the costs and rewards of units to achieve good coordination.
This is done by budgetary and accounting controls, judgements of
administrative courts, opinions of administrative advisory bodies, and
pressure from inter-ministerial committees, which are eventually backed
by executive decisions taken at the political level. But the purpose of
coordination at the national level is not to maximise benefits for the
agencies involved. Consistency in policy and policy implementation is
regarded as a political necessity for governments.
The coordinating instruments evident at the state level are either not
present at the EU level or present in a diluted form. EU inter-
governmental agencies are financed by inter-governmental means and areFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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not subject to EU budgetary controls. Many EU-financed programmes in
JHA are co-financed with the member states, over which the EU can
exercise partial budgetary controls. The EU Court of Auditors has
emerged as a powerful form of control wherever EU funds are involved.
The European Court of Justice of First Instance is a rapidly expanding
administrative jurisdiction, but it is by no means the equivalent of the
French Conseil d’Etat either as an administrative court or an
administrative advisory body. Joint working parties and joint meetings
have acquired an important role in coordinating practices, although they
are not the equivalent of inter-ministerial committees at the national level.
However, JHA institutions and agencies are of such relatively recent
creation that coordination between them has not yet surfaced as a
pressing issue. There are concerns about the overlap between Europol and
the Schengen system, which is stimulating the first discussions of
coordination. It is too early to advance highly developed schemes of what
ought to be the over-arching coordinating mechanisms in the JHA area.
But a systematic enquiry ought to be made into the problems involved in
conjunction with assessments of management efficiency within the
agencies.
2.6 The concept of efficiency
The European Commission has made a practice of commissioning from
evaluation reports on specific programmes from panels of experts or
management consultants. These are based on both qualitative and
quantitative analysis. Value for money and “efficiency” are concepts
frequently used. Both, and particularly the latter, are slippery concepts
and alleged misuse of them can cause angry reactions from the groups
being assessed. The two main professional groups most involved in JHA,
police and magistrates, are particularly sensitive about attempts to apply
these concepts to their activities. Efficiency is desirable in JHA
cooperation but what this means should be carefully reviewed; different
kinds of efficiency criteria should be developed which should be easily
comprehensible and avoid technical complexity.
Efficiency is a concept that has been a particular preoccupation of
economists. Pareto made the most influential contribution to the
definition of efficiency in his discussion of maximising welfare, positing
that an efficient outcome is one that makes some people better off
without worsening the situation for others. Pareto-optimal policy
solutions bring additional net benefits for some of the parties concerned
while not incurring costs to others. Agreeing on a cooperative JHA policy
solution that meets the Pareto-efficient criteria may be politicallyANDERSON & APAP
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unsustainable. Policy-makers at the political level are rarely concerned
with efficiency only – often they scarcely take it into account.
Calculations of national interest – particularly political and electoral
impacts – are often given much higher priority. Nonetheless, assessment
policies in terms of Pareto optimality can serve as a valuable reminder to
the highest level of decision-makers that other criteria exist.
Currently, benchmarks for efficient policy in this field do not exist
although the Tampere scoreboard provides a yardstick for efficient
policy-making (in the sense of whether decisions are taken in a timely
manner). The Tampere Presidency Conclusions of 1999 and the Tampere
scoreboard are the boldest and the most far-reaching documents approved
by all member states. The former laid out a broad vision for “a union of
freedom, security and justice” and called for specific common actions in
four broad areas: asylum and migration policy, justice, the fight against
crime and external policy vis-à-vis third countries. It put forward a
strategy on what objectives the Union should pursue and what
instruments it should seek to acquire within the clear timeframe laid out
in the scoreboard. It also introduced a biannual review process, conducted
by the Commission, of the progress made towards achieving the common
goals.
Justified criticisms have been directed at the slow progress in
implementing the Tampere scoreboard. In its review of the second half of
2001, however, the Commission emphasised the major advance in “the
general acceptance of the concept of mutual recognition of Court
judgements as a practical way of overcoming deeply embedded
differences in Member States' judicial traditions and structures.” It,
nevertheless, expressed regret for the failure to meet the Tampere
deadlines in specific areas involving new legislation. The biggest danger
arising from such delays, in the Commission's view, is the formulation
and implementation of national policies with little or no consideration of
the European dimension and the lack of interest in member states for
further regulation at European level. Undoubtedly, taking decisions in a
timely way is an important element in assessing the efficiency of
European initiatives in JHA.
Even in the area of immigration and asylum where the “pillar switch”
(from the third to the first pillar) was expected to create a momentum for
improved and more efficient decision-making, progress has been slow.
The reasons are that the unanimity rule is still required for most decisions
and political will for making concessions and speeding up negotiations
has been lacking. Abandoning the unanimity rule in blocked areas would
be an efficiency gain. The Commission proposes legislation in a timelyFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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manner, lout this is not yet sufficient to ensure positive results in the
immigration and asylum policy domain as the legislation gets blocked in
the Council.
Implementation of the Tampere scoreboard is further impeded by the
complexities of enlargement and these can be the enemy of efficiency.
The JHA  acquis is constantly evolving and confronting applicant
countries with difficulties in adapting to ever-changing demands and
complying with legislation with far-reaching consequences. This is not to
say that enlargement constitutes an obstacle for achieving an area of
freedom, security and justice, but it does introduce additional strains in
the JHA policy-making and policy implementation. Considering the
intricacies of accession negotiations, reasonable expectations need to be
set for benchmarks in JHA.
Cost-benefit analysis is an important way of assessing efficiency and has
the advantage that a large body of practical experience is available. In the
JHA field it has limited but useful application to specific activities of
particular agencies. The quality audit developed by agencies such as the
UK Audit Commission is, to a large extent, based on cost-benefit
analysis. It can be applied to the Schengen Information System,
intelligence analysis by Europol, requests for advice and assistance to
Eurojust and so on. Published quality audit reports would serve as useful
management tools for the agencies concerned and provide useful
publicity for the good work that they are doing. It is important, however,
that rigorous cost-benefit/quality auditing is not applied in the initial
stages of the setting-up of agencies. There should be an initial period
when directors and managers have the opportunity to experiment and
adjust resources available to the strategic objectives set for them. The
various public agencies envisaged by Tampere such as EUROJUST, the
Police Chiefs Task Force and the European Police College (CEPOL)
have been established and, to varying degrees, commenced operations,
but it is too early to impose quality auditing, as opposed to accounts
auditing.
More generally, efficiency has to be assessed in terms of fundamental but
intangible criteria such as building trust among member states, allowing
for flexibility in policy formulation and implementation and taking into
consideration the feasibility of convergence among member states in the
specific sub-fields of JHA cooperation. What is needed is an evaluation
that is both pragmatic and imaginative in terms of what is achievable
given the existing constraints. This should be developed by an
“Observatory” set up to monitor and assess implementation of JHA
policy.ANDERSON & APAP
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Institutional questions will be discussed in Chapter 5 but some
institutional features of the EU impact efficiency, partly because, as
discussed in the preceding section, they make the system more
cumbersome than it should be. The practice of rotating the EU presidency
every six months brings new priorities to the agenda of the Council on a
regular basis, and JHA issues are not always a top priority. Indeed, the
Commission has been consistent in its efforts to develop a coherent
strategy for different issue areas of JHA. Yet many proposals tabled by
the Commission are delayed, pending approval by the Council of
Ministers. Unanticipated events can disrupt consistency and continuity in
the policy process, as amply demonstrated by September 11
th.
2.7 Recommendations
1.  The EU Commission should propose a trust-building strategy in JHA,
which should involve all the professional groups involved in the
member states. In the first instance, this should be done by evaluating
and coordinating existing policies that contribute to trust-building.
2.  A quality audit should accompany an audit of accounts for the EU
agencies involved in JHA. This quality audit should involve
specialists in management, public administration, cultural
anthropology and social psychology, as well as those from member
states with experience in conducting quality audits.
3.  Research should be commissioned on the needs of coordination
between JHA cooperative arrangements and EU agencies in JHA with
a view to proposing instruments of coordination and whether any
changes in their remit are desirable.
4.  An independent JHA Observatory should be set up to monitor the
implementation of JHA policy, which should publicise best practice,
as well as indicating omissions. This Observatory should be managed
by a small board appointed by the European Council and consisting
of practitioners as well as recognised authorities on EU policies.29
CHAPTER 3
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICY
3.1 Context
During the 1990s, immigration and asylum became the most widely
debated item on the Justice and Home Affairs agenda. This was the result
of several factors. An influx of refugees from non-European countries as
well as the Balkan conflicts resulted in growing pressure for a common
EU asylum policy, going beyond that of the 1990 Dublin Convention.
The latter, concerning which state is responsible for examining requests
for asylum does not really work and a more comprehensive agreement is
required. The failure of “zero immigration” targets, the persistence of
irregular immigration, the need for immigrant workers in some sectors in
the face of an ageing European population coupled with the removal of
internal border controls promoted the idea of a common EU immigration
policy. The great challenge for the European Union is to reach agreement
on positive policies in these fields and not to fall back into the negative
position of simply restricting entry as much as possible into the EU.
With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in
 May 1999, the field
of “visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free
movement of persons” came under the first pillar, under the jurisdiction
of the European Community law, under Title IV of the EC Treaty (Arts
61-69). The fields moved into EC jurisdiction are:
a)  border controls;
b)  the issue of visas;
c)  the circulation of nationals of third countries within the territory
of the Community;
d)  measures concerning asylum (jurisdiction for examining
applications for asylum, minimum regulations governing the
reception afforded to asylum-seekers, the attribution of the status
of refugee and the concession or revocation of such a status);
e)  measures applicable to refugees and displaced persons
(temporary protection, a balance of efforts between the states
receiving the refugees and displaced persons);
f)  measures in the field of immigration policy (conditions of entry
and residence, issue of long-term visas and residence permits,
including the ones for reunification of families);ANDERSON & APAP
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g)  irregular immigration and residence, including repatriation of
irregulars; and
h)  measures governing the extent to which nationals of third
countries can stay in member states other than the one in which
they are legally residents.
The question of jurisdiction is therefore in principle resolved and the
Conclusions of the European Council in Tampere (15-16 October 1999)
provided a framework for the adoption of measures considered necessary
in these fields. However, the devil is in the detail. This area of policy
remains governed by the unanimity rule until the end of 2004, and
agreement is not easy on many detailed measures, with member states
wishing to preserve as much of their authority as possible. Even specific
problems that have caused political tension – such as the Sangatte
reception centre for asylum-seekers wishing to enter the UK, which is
situated close to the French end of the Channel Tunnel – have proven
difficult to resolve. Consensus on the general strategy for dealing with
illegal immigrants has not been easy, as the weak compromise at the June
2002 Seville Council demonstrated.
3.2 An Increased role for the European Commission in the field of
immigration and asylum
The changes in the Treaty of Amsterdam meant that the Commission has
increased authority and a developing role in this area. The activity of the
Commission to date has been positive and forward-looking. It merits
more recognition and greater support than it has so far received.
The Commission emphasises the distinction between immigration and
asylum, although recognising that the two overlap in important ways in
the day-to-day work of national administrations. In communications to
the Council and the European Parliament of November 2000, the
Commission re-launched the debate on a common asylum and
immigration policy at European level and pointed to the benefits of going
beyond minimum standards in asylum and immigration policy. Stressing
the linkage between immigration and asylum issues and other policy
areas such as employment policy, social development and integration and
economic policy in the context of an ageing population, the Commission
tried to convince opinion, and national governments in particular, of the
gains to be made by fully developed EU-wide policies.
The Commission has also promoted measures to ensure appropriate legal
protection of immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, including respect
for human rights and enjoyment of privileges similar, where possible, toFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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those of EU nationals. An example is the proposed Directive on the
freedom of travel within the Schengen area for third-country nationals. It
was complemented by a proposed Directive, published on 11 July 2001,
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the
purpose of paid employment and self-employment. In addition, the
Commission has prepared a draft Directive on the admission of third-
country nationals for study and vocational training purposes. The
extension, on certain conditions, of the free movement of persons and
other fundamental rights of EU citizens under EU law to non-EU
nationals is a basic step in allowing third-country nationals to enjoy the
benefits of the EU legal space.
Events have proved, however, at least temporarily, a powerful
determinant of the direction of European interests. The electoral rise of
the populist and extreme Right in member states in 2002 has tilted the
balance back to repressive measures.
3.3 Asylum policy
In the past, decisions about whether or not to grant asylum have been
essentially political, an act of sovereign power, even though the 1951
Geneva Convention placed a general obligation on signatory states to
give sanctuary to persecuted persons. The project to achieve a general EU
system requires that the whole regime for reception, treatment,
consideration of requests and repatriation is routinised and de-politicised.
Whether this can be completely achieved remains an open question. It is,
however, a desirable aim that ought to be pursued.
Based of the experience of recurring Balkan conflicts, the Commission
proposed a Council Decision for a European Refugee Fund on 14
December 1999. The objective was a framework for “structural”
measures to facilitate the reception and voluntary repatriation of asylum-
seekers. Also included was emergency aid to help member states face the
financial burden in the event of an unexpected arrival of large numbers of
refugees or displaced persons – the first attempt at burden-sharing and
common responsibility for refugees by the EU member states. The
proposal establishing the European Refugee Fund was adopted as Council
Decision 2000/596/EC on 28 September 2000.
The provision of minimum temporary protection for displaced persons,
including residence permits, access to employment, accommodation and
housing, means of subsistence, access to medical treatment, the right to
education of minors, and so on, was proposed by the Commission in May
2000. The initiative was to harmonise the temporary protection measures
across national borders in the EU while preventing ‘asylum-shopping’ANDERSON & APAP
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opportunities and simplifying decision-making mechanisms. The
European Parliament approved the proposal on 13 March 2001. The
Directive (2001/55/EC) was formally adopted by the Council on 20 July
2001, and became the first serious achievement in European regulation of
asylum.
Initiatives to develop a European asylum dimension include the Council
Regulation 2725/2000 on 11 December 2000, to establish “Eurodac” for
fingerprints of asylum-seekers. The Eurodac system is meant to help
effectively apply the “first safe haven” principle of the Dublin
Convention. It will be operational by the end of 2002, if every member
state is ready. On 15 March 2001, Norway and Iceland were incorporated
into the Eurodac.
The European Commission persistently seeks to devise a comprehensive
European asylum regime. In September 2000, it tabled a proposal for a
Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in member states
for granting and withdrawing refugee status. The approach respects
national regulatory systems and avoids the introduction of uniform
procedures. The member states have wide discretion to apply their
national procedures as long as they ensure certain minimum standards
with respect to granting and withdrawing refugee status. These will
probably be the basis of the measures, approved by the Seville Council,
for the repatriation of refugees (particularly Afghans) when they are
worked out in detail.
The Commission adopted a similar approach in a draft Directive setting
out minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers by member
states. The latter aims at providing equal legal treatment and an adequate
level of assistance to asylum applicants and their families in the period of
evaluation of their cases by respective national authorities. The method
relies on a high degree of trust in the respective public bodies and
regulations of other member states. While member states have experience
in implementing the principle of mutual recognition in areas related to the
single market, it remains to be seen whether they can transfer this
experience to the area of asylum policy.
3.4 Immigration policy
Immigration policy is probably the most difficult and sensitive policy
area for the EU because of the great divide between elites in the member
states and the European institutions and large populations throughout the
European Union. The political danger is that the groups hostile to
immigration will blame the EU, and the Commission in particular, evenFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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though any policy must carry the agreement and the authority of the
member states.
Currently there are four dimensions to the EU immigration policy:
1.  Regulation of migration flows;
2.  Integration of those residing in the EU;
3.  Co-development; and
4.  Readmission of illegal immigrants.
One of the first post-Amsterdam initiatives proposed by the Commission
in the area of immigration is the draft Directive on the right to family
reunification, submitted to the Council on 1 December 1999. This draft
Directive – the first in a series on the admission of third-country nationals
– is not yet approved.
The Commission also made a striking intervention in November 2000
with a Communication with a Green Paper analysing the state of the
immigration debate. The Commission took as a starting point “a growing
recognition that the ‘zero immigration’ policies of the past thirty years are
no longer appropriate” in the current economic and demographic context
of the European Union and of the countries of origin. It argued for a “new
approach”, according to which legal channels for immigration should be
available, especially for labour migrants. The Commission emphasised
the need for a “proactive” immigration policy, which is to say to replace
attempts to prevent immigration by a form of controlled immigration that
responds to the changing needs of the European labour market.
The Commission rejected a European wide quota system as
“impracticable”, but suggested “indicative targets” – a system based on
periodic reports of the member states, examining the impact of their
immigration policies and making projections on the number of economic
migrants they would need in future (including their qualification levels).
These indicative targets would take into account labour market needs in
each member state, agreements in place with countries of origin of
migrants, public acceptability of additional migrants, resources available
for reception and integration, possibilities of cultural and social
adaptation, and so on.
This process should take into account the development of the general
employment situation in the EU, and progress in the implementation of
the European Strategy for employment, defined by the European
Councils of Luxembourg (1997) and Lisbon (March 2000). The
mechanism proposed by the Commission leaves authority to the memberANDERSON & APAP
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states on the admission of migrants, but the various migration policies
would be coordinated. Whether member states will follow the lead of the
Commission in this modest proposal, considering the sensitivity of
immigration and the differences of approach to the issue at the national
level remains to be seen.
The Commission’s proposal for a Council Directive of 11 July 2001 on
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the
purposes of paid employment and self-employed economic activity is
another move forward in the same direction. This is also aimed at
improved efficient management of migration flows through the
introduction of common criteria in all member states and a single
procedure (and single “stay and work” document) for applications from
eligible third-country nationals. The principle of fair treatment of legal
residents from third countries has been addressed by the adoption of
legislation on equal treatment irrespective of racial and ethnic origin and
on combating racism and discrimination.
Other initiatives of the Commission submitted to the Council in 2001 and
2002 for its review and approval include proposals for Council Directives
concerning:
1.  the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents;
2.  an action programme for administrative cooperation in the fields of
external borders, visas, asylum and immigration;
3.  minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-country
nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who
otherwise need international protection; and
4.  a short-term residence permit issued to victims of trafficking in
human beings who cooperate with the competent authorities.
This represents a considerable work programme and clearly places
important elements of a comprehensive immigration policy on the
agenda.
3.5 The open coordination method
In three successive Communications to the Council and the European
Parliament in 2001 and 2002, the Commission elaborated its ideas on an
open method of coordination for Community policies on immigration,
illegal immigration and asylum. This methodological contribution is of
fundamental importance in arriving at a common policy on these issues.
It is based on the assumption that greater convergence among member
states can deliver much better results for the whole system. It addressesFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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the multi-dimensional character of immigration and asylum, the
multiplicity of actors and public bodies involved and the continued
competence of national governments over policy and policy
implementation. The Commission proposed an approach, which “implies
drawing up strategic guidelines, benchmarking, targeting and the
introduction of monitoring to evaluate progress”. This complements a
legal framework with intensive consultations and deliberations among
member state representatives to ensure gradual convergence on policy
objectives and methods.
The Commission sees its role in the open coordination method as
“presenting proposals for European guidelines, ensuring coordination of
national policies, the exchange of best practice and evaluation of the
impact of Community policy, as well as through regular consultations
with third countries concerned”. In line with this strategy, the
Commission suggested the following European guidelines on
immigration:
•  Developing a comprehensive and coordinated approach to migration
management at national level;
•  Improving legal information available on admission to the EU and on
the consequences of using illegal channels;
•  Reinforcing the fight against illegal immigration, smuggling and
trafficking;
•  Establishing a coherent and transparent policy and procedures for
opening the labour market to third-country nationals within the
framework of the European employment strategy;
•  Integrating migration issues into relations with third countries, in
particular with the countries of origin; and
•  Ensuring the development of integration policies for third-country
nationals residing legally in the territories of the member states.
Likewise, in the area of illegal immigration, the Commission has singled
out six issues for possible further coordination among member states:
•  Visa policy;
•  Infrastructure for information exchange, cooperation and
coordination;
•  Border management;
•  Police cooperation;ANDERSON & APAP
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•  Aliens law and criminal law; and
•  Repatriation and readmission policy.
The targets identified by the Commission in the area of asylum policy
are:
•  Improving the understanding of migratory flows connected with
humanitarian admissions;
•  Developing an effective asylum system that offers protection to those
who need it, according to a full and inclusive application of the
Geneva Convention;
•  Improving the effectiveness of the policy on returns;
•  Including matters relating to international protection with regard to
third countries; and
•  Ensuring that policies are framed to promote the integration or
inclusion of beneficiaries of international protection in a member
state.
These broad guidelines, together with specific suggestions on each, aim
to streamline consultations among member states and encourage the
setting of a timetable with short-term, medium-term and long-term
objectives. The guidelines can then be incorporated into national policies
by appropriate policy instruments to take into account the national
specificities of member states. The open coordination approach is
predicated on the willingness of member states to proceed with
approximation of their immigration and asylum regimes. The
Commission can do little without the full support of national
governments.
This area provides a convincing illustration of the premise that the inter-
governmental and the communitarian methods, often presented as
competitive or antagonistic, can in practice be complementary. The
Commission is active in setting the agenda for member states' discussion
and decision, by proposing a framework of legislation and suggesting
further areas of integration in the immigration and asylum fields.
The Commission raised various policy issues to communicate its strategy
and to invite ideas on the development of policy to other EU institutions
and to national policy-making circles. An example is the Green Paper on
a Community return policy on illegal residents, issued by the
Commission on 11 April 2002. The primary objective of the paper is to
solicit opinions from interested parties, including the EuropeanFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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Parliament, the Council, candidate countries, third-country partners,
NGOs, the academic community and other organisations to increase the
number of voices in the policy-making process. The Commission wishes
to generate innovative ideas in the fight against illegal immigration by
presenting in the near future a Communication on European border
management, including the creation of a European Border Guard (an
Italian-led feasibility study was completed in May 2002). Also on the
agenda is the creation of a European visa identification system to allow
the exchange of information on visas issued by member states.
The breadth of issues the Commission has striven to put on the EU
agenda on immigration and asylum is indicative of a consistent strategy
to expand the EU mandate in this area. The Commission is acting as a
policy entrepreneur to structure the debate and guide the legislative
programme of the Council, but the member states, acting through the
Council, have the final say on policy decisions and set the pace of
progress towards Europeanisation of this policy domain. National policy-
makers are driven by different considerations and the success of the
Commission in convincing them of the benefits of convergence of
national systems will ultimately determine the extent to which the
Commission has made a difference in the policy process. The roles of the
European Parliament and the European Court of Justice are still marginal
but will probably increase in future. The quest for greater accountability
and transparency in EU decision-making in general can be expected to
result in more direct parliamentary and judicial oversight in the JHA
system in the future.
Given the political pressures, the place of immigration policy will
increase in EU external policy and in policy on overseas aid (it is already
present in the Euro-Med partnership. The idea of placing sanctions on
countries of origin for failing to control illegal migration, floated at the
June 2002 Seville European Council, has given wide publicity to this
possibility. The proposal to sanction poor countries is impractical because
it is virtually impossible for any non-totalitarian regime effectively to
control exit from its territory. But migration diplomacy to reach
agreements on legal immigration to the EU and co-development
programmes to reduce migratory pressures should be actively pursued.
This will require more coordination between the EU first, second and
third pillars and will result in further pressure for institutional reform.
3.6 The EU member states: Willing or unwilling partners?
Very few of the Commission’s ideas have so far been translated into
legislation by the member states, which raises the questions of why this isANDERSON & APAP
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so and whether national governments are genuinely committed to
cooperate in this field.
The texts adopted by the Council in the JHA area, in the course of 2000-
02, show that immigration and asylum issues have not been priorities for
the member states. Three important decisions have been taken, however.
On 25 November 1999, the Council agreed on standard clauses to be
included in all readmission agreements between the European
Community, its member states and third countries. This decision
standardises the application of the “safe third country” principle by
member states in relations between the EU and third countries in general,
including applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe. The
principle has been widely accepted in the national legislation of member
states in the 1990s in the wake of the democratisation process in Central
and Eastern Europe, which established this region as safe for refugees. A
network of readmission agreements between member states and the
neighbouring countries is now in place.
Another Directive adopted by the Council, on the initiative of the French
government, concerns the mutual recognition of decisions on the
expulsion of third-country nationals. This text contains certain
complexities in the expulsion procedure and its applicability to different
categories of third-country nationals. It makes a very brief reference to
the obligation of member states to apply the Directive “with due respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. The right of third-country
nationals to appeal against expulsion is recognised, according to the
national legislation of the member state issuing the order. But the major
purpose of the directive is to ensure that once an individual is expelled by
one member state, s/he becomes a  persona non grata in the whole
Schengen area. Trust in the national administration of other member
states for enforcing a restrictive measure does not seem to pose a problem
in this field.
An area of increasing concern for the member states is the fight against
illegal immigration. This is a point where pillar I and III issues come
close together. Due to the linkage with criminal activities and the political
willingness of national governments to cooperate in combating crime,
illegal immigration is becoming more and more the focus of initiatives
undertaken by the Council. In October 2001, in view of the intensifying
cooperation between CIREFI ( Centre for Information, Discussion and
Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration) and Europol in
the field of illegal immigration and related issues, an agreement was
reached in COREPER on a list of measures to reinforce the working
relationship between the two bodies.FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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The Spanish Presidency subsequently put forward a proposal for a
comprehensive plan to combat illegal immigration and trafficking of
human beings in the EU in February 2002. This very detailed document
covers a broad spectrum of issues including visa policy, information
exchange and analysis, pre-frontier measures, measures relating to border
management, readmission and return policy, the role of Europol in
fighting illegal immigration and penalties for different categories of legal
violations. It suggests concrete measures to be adopted and implemented
by member states in the short- and medium-term in order to make
cooperation in this area more efficient. The Spanish Presidency envisaged
a role for the Commission in evaluating the progress towards achieving
these goals on an annual basis similar to the Tampere scoreboard. This
initiative was taken up enthusiastically by the rest of the national
governments as it is clear that illegal immigration is one issue area where
member states are more likely to resort to common action. The fight
against illegal immigration occupied a central place in the discussions
among the Heads of State or Government at the Seville European Council
and the measures adopted to that end are a clear indication that the
member states are getting serious about common action in immigration
policy.
Yet, member states more easily find common ground for cooperation on
restrictive and repressive initiatives and are slower and more reluctant to
promote rights for third-country nationals and a pro-active immigration
policy. Legislation limiting rather than reinforcing the rights of
immigrants and asylum-seekers has dominated the agenda of the Council.
The measures adopted, while involving greater coordination among
national systems, do not interfere directly in very sensitive areas for
national governments. Common actions involving more substantive
encroachments in the national sovereignty of member states are still
pending the Council's approval.
The political pressures on the member states are obvious and difficult to
combat without exposing “Europe” to a populist backlash. Further
information campaigns on the need for immigrants are required. The EU
and the member states should conduct these in a cooperative and
coordinated manner. The most important measures to counter anti-
immigration sentiment concern labour market policies that have nothing
directly to do with immigration. Greater labour market flexibility in order
to prevent high structural unemployment and low participation rates in
the labour market, evident even in times of economic expansion, would
undermine the argument that “immigrants take our jobs”. Measures to
promote more labour mobility between member states are also an aid to
labour flexibility. Similarly, assisting female participation in the labourANDERSON & APAP
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market by adequate childcare and re-training after periods of absence for
child-rearing would contribute towards this end. Allowing, and even
encouraging, people beyond the statutory retirement age to continue
working is an additional avenue that should be explored at the EU level.
Making it clear to European electorates that immigrants are necessary, in
what numbers and with what qualifications is the only way forward in
this politically sensitive area.
3.7 Recommendations
1.  The open coordination method, promoted by the Commission, should
be energetically and persistently pursued as a means of associating as
wide a range of constituencies as possible in the policy-making
process.
2.  Timely consideration should be given by the Council to the proposals
laid before it by the Commission, and a scoreboard on the model of
the Tampere scoreboard should be established for this area.
3.  Another Green Paper, a sequel to that of November 2001, should be
published on immigration and a separate one published on asylum to
reinvigorate public debate and to invite contributions from “civil
society” at an early stage in the policy debate.
4.  These Green Papers should form part of a wider publicity and
information action, which should be conducted jointly by the
Commission and the member states to avoid the possibility of making
the Commission a scapegoat by anti-immigrant groups and timorous
governments.
5.  Labour market policies should be reviewed in order to ensure that
anti-immigrant arguments have little basis to mobilise public support.
6.  Migration diplomacy to reach agreements on legal immigration to the
EU and co-development programmes to reduce migratory pressures
should be actively pursued.41
CHAPTER 4
JUDICIAL AND POLICE COOPERATION
he idea of a “European judicial space” was first popularised by the
French President Valèry Giscard d’Estaing, in the 1970s. It was
then intended as an instrument to combat terrorism in a situation
where individual European states were subject to blackmailing pressure
from Middle Eastern terrorist groups. A European judicial area, however,
only began to become a reality after the Treaty of Amsterdam. Although
repression of terrorism is still a driving force behind the idea of a
European judicial area, the project is very much more ambitious
involving cooperation in repression of all forms of serious crime,
cooperation in civil law matters, securing free movement and the defence
of individual rights.
A European judicial area can be created by three methods – the creation
of an European Criminal Code and a new European jurisdiction in
criminal matters; mutual recognition of the judicial decisions in one
member state across the whole of the European Union; and the
approximation of laws and penal policies. Member states and the legal
professions are wary about the first method and little progress has been
made. However, for offences against the financial interests of the EU and
in some civil law matters, it will be the route taken. The second is the
method in which the most dramatic developments have taken place. The
third is a continuing but slow, and little publicised, process. There are
likely to be concurrent, even competing, projects of judicial
cooperation/integration going on, following different methods.
The establishment of a European judicial area poses two categories of
problems. The first is the inevitable complexity of such a project. This
creates problems of communicating the implications of decisions made
and legislation enacted to the professional groups affected by them in the
member states, to national policy-makers and to broad sections of the
public. The second is the weak constitutional, democratic and social
legitimacy of the project. The legitimacy of EU action in this area is not
underpinned, as it is in the member states, by centuries-long practice of
the exercise of authority. The EU is a very complex social and political
space, which hinders the development of a strong sense of common
identity – a pre-condition of democratic legitimacy. These matters are
discussed in Chapter 5.
TANDERSON & APAP
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At present, there is an ambiguous sharing of competences in EU
arrangements in judicial and police matters between the national and
European levels of policy-making. Judicial cooperation in civil matters
with cross-border implications, including the simplification of civil
proceedings, the taking of evidence and cross-border service of
documents is in the first pillar and is a considered a Community business.
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation is in the
third pillar where the right of initiative is shared between the Commission
and the member states. A peculiar feature of the division of labour in
police cooperation is the communitarisation of the investigation of fraud
against the Community's financial interests, an area that is currently an
exclusive domain of the European Commission.
Judicial cooperation specifically among EU member states does not have
a long history. There is a wide variation of the national jurisdictions of
member states, which renders any attempt at harmonisation and
convergence difficult, both politically and operationally. The first steps in
collaboration between the national judicial authorities came with the
Maastricht Treaty that provided for the establishment of liaison
magistrates, a European Judicial Network and promotion of best practices
in judicial cooperation in criminal matters. These measures were mainly
aimed at information exchange and familiarisation of legal practitioners
with jurisdictions and counterparts in other member states. While modest
in their nature, they set the stage for further European initiatives in the
judicial field, which culminated in the establishment of Eurojust (legally
recognised in the Treaty of Nice but proposed earlier at the Tampere
Summit).
4.1 Judicial cooperation in civil matters
The distinction between civil and criminal matters in judicial cooperation
is critical for understanding developments in the European judicial area.
The Treaty of Amsterdam links civil judicial cooperation with the
principle of free movement of persons, thus giving the Commission the
right to propose legislative initiatives. Criminal justice cooperation is
exclusively the domain of the member states with much less possibility of
involvement of supranational institutions in policy-making.
Judicial cooperation in civil law matters is generally of lower political
profile and sensitivity than in criminal matters – although particular
matters, such as custody of children, has caused strained relations
between member states in the past. Many civil law issues are highly
technical and, for much of the time, of interest only to professionals.
Three main priorities in civil matters were identified by the Heads ofFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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State or Government at Tampere: 1) better access to justice; 2) mutual
recognition of judicial decisions; and 3) approximation of legal
procedures.
Action on these is very recent, and therefore worth recalling in a certain
detail. Adequate level of legal aid in cross-border cases has been a key
concern of the Commission, which published a Green Paper on legal aid
in civil matters in March 2000. This first initiative was followed up by a
hearing with national experts and professionals on 20 February 2001,
which endorsed Community action on the matter. To take account of
different national perspectives early in the process, the Commission
organised a meeting with experts from the member states on 29 June
2001, to present a draft proposal for a Council Directive on better access
to justice and invited comments. The Commission then proposed on 18
January 2002 a Council Directive to improve access to justice in cross-
border disputes by establishing minimum common rules for legal aid and
other financial aspects of civil proceedings.
A similar strategy of broad consultations with member states and
reaching a general consensus before undertaking legislative initiatives has
been the approach of the Commission in two additional matters. On 28
September 2001, the Commission issued a Green Paper on compensation
to crime victims with the purpose of soliciting expert opinions on
possible measures to be taken by the EU. Similarly, it published a Green
Paper on alternative dispute resolution in civil and commercial law on 19
April 2002 to initiate a wide debate.
Mutual recognition of judicial decisions has been established by the
European Council as a fundamental principle of judicial cooperation in
both civil and criminal matters. Legislative initiatives upholding the
principle have been sponsored by the member states themselves acting
through the Council, for example:
•  Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in
civil and commercial matters (known as the “Brussels I”
Regulation);
•  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in
matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for
children of both spouses (known as the “Brussels II” Regulation);
•  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on
insolvency proceedings; andANDERSON & APAP
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•  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1348 of 29 May 2000 on the service in
the member states of judicial and extra-judicial documents in civil or
commercial matters.
In addition, the Commission has tabled a proposal for a Council
Regulation on parental responsibility that would extend the principle of
mutual recognition to all decisions in that area, following the example set
in the Brussels II regulation. The Council is also discussing a proposal for
a Regulation on rights of access to children put forward by France on the
basis of mutual recognition of judicial decisions.
The Council adopted ancillary measures intended to foster cooperation
between national judicial authorities, including Regulation (EC) No.
1206/2001 on cooperation between the courts of member states in the
taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters and Decision
2001/470/EC establishing a European Judicial Network in civil and
commercial matters. All these initiatives, while not far-reaching in terms
of substantial convergence of member states’ judicial regimes, introduce
a degree of coordination among national authorities and administrative
improvements. They also aim at setting some minimum standards for
certain aspects of civil procedure, which can prepare the ground for
further approximation of law.
The following recommendations for priorities in civil law are matters for
rapid attention:
•  The principle of mutual recognition should remain the cornerstone of
future work on European judicial cooperation in civil matters. The
mutual recognition programme adopted by the Council should be
implemented. In particular, priority should be given to decisions
concerning uncontested claims making it possible to establish a
genuine European Enforcement Order as well as to certain
judgements concerning family law disputes such as the cross-border
right of access to children.
•  The setting of minimum standards for procedures for serving
documents, respecting the principles of member states’ laws, is a
logical precondition for the full application of the principle of mutual
recognition, and should also constitute a priority.
•  The compatibility of the rules applicable in member states with
regard to conflicts of laws, provided for in Art. 65 of the Treaty, is
also an important element of mutual recognition. Discussions should
be started as quickly as possible on the matter of the law applicable to
extra-contractual obligations.FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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4.2 Judicial cooperation in criminal matters
The one area of criminal judicial cooperation where the Commission has
an official right of legislative initiative is that initiated by a celebrated
report to the European Parliament by Prof. Delmas-Marty – the protection
of the Community's financial interests against criminal offence.
The European Commission’s Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) proposed the
establishment of a European Public Prosecutor, an independent judicial
authority with powers of investigation and prosecution in all EU member
states into criminal acts, such as fraud and corruption, against the
Community's financial interests. It issued a Green Paper on the possible
legal status and organisation of the European Public Prosecutor, the range
of offences to be covered, various issues of procedural law and the
problem of judicial review.
The initial reaction of the member states to the Green Paper was
unenthusiastic. At the Laeken European Council meeting in December
2001, the Heads of State and Government showed a willingness to
explore the feasibility of the project, calling on the Council to “examine
swiftly” the Commission proposal. At the Justice, Home Affairs and Civil
Protection Council Meeting of 28 February 2002, however, the Ministers
of the member states expressed unease about setting up a European
Public Prosecutor. They raised concerns about the timeliness of the
proposal on the grounds that Eurojust and OLAF have not yet had enough
time to gain sufficient experience in the fight against financial fraud.
Pointing to the constitutional complexities evoked by the Green Paper,
ministers showed little support for the proposed initiative.
Behind the reluctance of member states to proceed with a European
Public Prosecutor are different perceptions of problems and priorities, as
well as unresolved contradictions between policy objectives. In the past,
member states have been slow to take adequate measures for the
repression of fraud against the Community budget. However, at the core
of their reluctance is inadequate mutual trust in the national judicial
systems, especially when some are perceived as very different and
inferior to one's own. A major incident of fraud or corruption may be
necessary to overcome this reticence. Nonetheless, this project must be
kept on the European agenda because it is the only adequate response to a
persistent problem.
Several political, legal and institutional difficulties can be identified as
hampering the setting up of a true European judicial area in criminal
matters. These are illustrated by the blockages in, and discussions of
current proposals.ANDERSON & APAP
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In accordance with point 37 of the Tampere Conclusions, the Council
adopted, within the time limits set, a range of proposals to implement the
principle of mutual recognition. Work on the first instruments (e.g.
freezing of assets, European arrest warrant) began with their acceptance
in principle but major differences of approach emerged.
In the case of the European arrest warrant, some member states are
reluctant to abolish supervisory checks in the state of enforcement
because they want to ascertain that the state of issue has complied with
the requirements of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Commission has been
asked to submit to the Council a proposal aimed at strengthening in all
member states minimum procedures of protection, developed by the case
law of the Court of Human Rights. This would increase the level of trust
in other member states’ judicial systems but there is also scepticism about
the competence of some of the magistrates in some countries. A French
proposal to set up a network of colleges for training of magistrates is
intended to address these doubts.
Several instruments approximating definition of crimes and penal
sanctions in the areas identified by the Amsterdam Treaty and by the
Tampere Conclusions have been adopted. The Community is, however,
faced with a three-fold difficulty: first, the diverse judicial systems in the
member states and the reluctance of member states to review their
criminal law; second, the consistency of their system of penalties is given
by member states as a reason for their opposition to harmonising penal
sanctions, especially when setting the minimum length of a maximum
sentence; third, member states differ on the relationship between
harmonisation and mutual recognition – some wish to emphasise the
latter in order to avoid the former.
There is little to be done about the first difficulty in the short term. On the
second two, the JHA Council as well as, in turn, the grand European
Council, should make clear its determination to undertake, as soon and as
ambitiously as possible, the exercise of approximating definition of
crimes and penalties in the areas defined by the Amsterdam Treaty and
the Tampere Council.
The competences of the Community and the Union in criminal matters
should also be clarified. When a Commission proposal for a Directive
competes with a framework decision proposed by a member state, which
has happened in the case of criminal sanctions for breaches in
environmental law, the Council's work is delayed and potentially
paralysed by conflicts over which legal basis to choose. This isFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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potentially a matter of concern in several areas: public procurement,
protection of EU financial interests, insider trading, combating traffic in
human beings, and so on.
As the Tampere scoreboard shows, member states are slow to ratify
International Conventions negotiated through the Council. Further, no
mechanism exists to monitor either their implementation or the ways in
which the member states implement framework decisions and decisions
adopted by the Council. There is a proposal that the Commission be
asked to make arrangements in all cases to submit to the Council reports
on progress in transposing the various instruments adopted in the
framework of Title VI of the TEU. In our view, monitoring should also
be done by an independent Observatory (as proposed in Chapter 2)
In the fields of crime prevention and criminal investigation, there is a
similar picture of achievements and difficulties, although police
cooperation has made the most remarkable advances. The Tampere
European Council emphasised in its Conclusions the development of a
preventive approach  to crime, in tandem with police cooperation and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The creation of a crime
prevention network and the setting up of a Forum on the prevention of
organised crime constitute two concrete achievements of this approach,
but the lower priority and the fewer resources than those given to
agencies involved in the investigation and repression of crime evident at
national levels, is also apparent at the EU level. Work in this area should
be actively promoted where EU initiatives have clear added value.
4.3 Police cooperation
European police cooperation should not be regarded in purely EU
institutional terms – Europol, Schengen, EU Customs cooperation, the
European Police Academy and the Police Chiefs Task Force. To do so
simplifies an extremely complex reality. Within the member states, the
criminal law, the law enforcement system and police organisation have
very different characteristics. This results in different priorities and
perspectives on cross-border cooperation. It also means that a whole
tissue of trans-border cooperative agreements and arrangements have
emerged over a long period of time outside the EU framework.
In addition, the field of internal security has greatly expanded in recent
years and agencies that are not conventionally described as police forces
are heavily involved. They are nevertheless important in control and
surveillance of persons, crime prevention and even in criminal
investigation. These include, inter alia, state security services, privateANDERSON & APAP
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security services (the best known are international ones such as Interpol),
private investigators, and fraud investigation agencies.
The relationship between state security services and police in the member
states is a difficult one that has relevance to the EU. In the field of
counter-terrorism and, to a lesser extent, in the fight against organised
crime, the role of the security services is central. The Police Chiefs Task
Force has been charged by the European Council with liasing with
intelligence services and this initiative should continue to receive strong
political backing.
A crucial area of the internationalisation of policing is informal
cooperation between police in different countries. The extent of
cooperation on the basis of reciprocity, which does not pass through
official channels, is to be assessed because it leaves no trace. When new
formal arrangements are set up for police cooperation, they almost always
produce informal cooperation alongside them. Informal cooperation often
arouses suspicions outside the police milieus, precisely because it lacks a
legal basis, but it is often an essential response to the need for quick
communication of information and rapid cooperation in a specific
criminal investigation.
Trust is the basis of all forms of police cooperation. In the absence of
trust, cooperation does not occur and this makes essential the trust-
building strategy, recommended in Chapter 2. Trust between police
forces is inevitably fragile and needs careful nurturing. Amongst the
many reasons for this fragility are:
￿  The legal and police systems of European states differ considerably
and there is still insufficient knowledge of these differences within
the police. Unfavourable comparisons are often made between “their
system” and “our system”.
￿  State frontiers remain crucial barriers in police work – the
psychological distance, despite modern means of transport and
communications, between police forces can be very great.
￿  Police malpractice (particularly corruption, use of excessive force
and pliability to political pressure) in other countries seems much less
acceptable both to the police and to the general population than in
one’s own country.
￿  The complexity of cooperative arrangements is confusing. Parallel
and overlapping methods of cooperation can be useful to law
enforcement officials because if one channel of communication doesFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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not work, another can be used. But their existence undermines
effective accountability and control.
￿  Ministries of the Interior, responsible for the police within the
member states, have often been the most nationalist and
souverainistes in their governments, except for those officials directly
engaged in EU affairs. Officials regard cooperation and trust-building
as a marginal issue until they directly affect cooperation about
specific matters.
There are three different levels of European police cooperation as viewed
by operational police officers. The highest level – Europol – is at a
considerable distance from what many investigating officers, until now,
consider to be “real police work”. Europol groups a relatively small
number of police officers operating in an international environment, with
an ambitious range of objectives. The national offices of Europol are
often located in units responsible for all international relations.
The Schengen system is at an intermediate level. It is a system of
information exchange, with on-line access to a database, complemented
by national offices to facilitate cooperation. It systematically and
continuously provides indispensable data to frontier police working at the
external frontier, and to others.
The third level is the local level which can be multilateral, for example,
Nebedeag-Pol at the Maastricht-Aachen, German, Netherlands, Belgium
frontier or bilateral such as the juxtaposed police stations at the Channel
tunnel, the joint police stations at the Franco-German, Franco-Spanish
frontiers and elsewhere. In this context, operational police officers are
operating alongside one another on a day-to-day basis.
It is usually at the third level that trust is most readily established and
lessons should be learned from this for the other two levels.
Europol is, and is likely to remain, the lynchpin of EU-level cooperation.
In establishing Europol, the EU acquired a police bureau without the
executive police powers (search seizure and arrest) characteristic of
police forces in the member states. The adoption of the many regulations
implementing the Europol Convention, the gradual extension of its
powers notably in relation to combating money laundering, the approval
of ever-growing budgets, the Council and the member states have ensured
that Europol has got off to the best possible start. However, in addition to
the delay in installing its computer system, Europol is not yet able –
despite a staff of over 250 persons and a budget of over €35 million – to
provide the member states' police services with sufficiently refined
analyses and information.ANDERSON & APAP
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The new tools for police cooperation have not yet produced the added
value in operational terms that was expected of them. The main reason is
the reluctance, widely but not universally shared, of police agencies in
member states to provide Europol with sensitive information. This
reluctance is based on a mixture of considerations. Many criminal
investigators are unwilling to communicate case-related information
except on “a-need-to-know” basis; state-centred, souverainistes attitudes
are common in police agencies because of their historically close affinity
with the state (or the Crown in the UK); Europol is often considered by
police officers as based on a political aspiration rather than police needs
and Europol has to demonstrate its value.
Some change in these attitudes, stimulated by particular incidents, may be
expected. Indeed, in his report to the (JHA) Council on 6 and 7 December
2001, the Director of Europol demonstrated that member states were
more willing to provide Europol with information following the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001. Other initiatives such as the embryonic
European Police College and the Working Group of Chiefs of Police
should help, if a conscious effort is made by them to promote an
understanding of the role of Europol. The introduction of Europol’s on-
line data storage and information exchange of criminal intelligence will
also contribute to its standing, provided that relations with the Schengen
and Interpol systems are resolved to the satisfaction of criminal
investigators.
The extension of Europol's powers to all the forms of crime mentioned in
the Annex to the Europol Convention provides too broad a remit and
requires that the Europol Management Board adopt a much more
selective strategic plan. The work begun under the French Presidency and
continued under the Swedish and Belgian Presidencies to define a
“vision” for Europol should provide the beginnings of a response. The
Council should request the Management Board of Europol to continue its
discussions on corporate governance and management control.
In the legislative field, work is under way to identify those Arts of the
Convention in need of amendment. Amendments should render binding
the two Resolutions adopted under the French Presidency on Europol's
participation in joint investigation teams and on the possibility of Europol
requesting member states to initiate investigations. The legal framework
required for setting up joint investigation teams will be in place since 1
July 2002, and these, in due course, should enhance the added value of
Europol in criminal investigation. It has yet to be determined whether
greater operational powers should be conferred on Europol and, if so,
what form of parliamentary control of its activities should be devised andFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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what arrangements should be made for cooperation with Eurojust.
Adequate systems of legal and political accountability are a sine qua non
of greater operational powers.
Four other initiatives in civil police cooperation are essential elements in
the emergent EU system – the Police Chiefs Task Force, the European
Police College (CEPOL), the new version of the Schengen Information
System, and Police in support of peacekeeping missions (CIVPOL).
The Tampere European Council decided to set up the Police Chiefs Task
Force as a forum for discussing and planning joint operations. The Police
Chiefs have potentially an important part to play in the preparation,
implementation and evaluation of the decisions taken by the Council. It
has met on four occasions since then but there is still uncertainty about its
role and purpose. Police officers often regard the EU as the business of
senior officials and politicians, in which they have no role, even though
the police unions have taken an interest in it. The Task Force could
provide a police “voice” in EU policy-making but its place in EU
institutions and its working methods remain to be worked out.
After a difficult start – it lacked legal personality and had no permanent
secretariat – the European Police College (CEPOL) drew up a more
targeted training programme on the basis of the Council's priorities. The
effectiveness of its activities will, however, depend on the European
Council's decision where to locate it and its transformation from a
network of police colleges into a genuine autonomous agency.
In addition to its function in the immigration field, the Schengen
Information System (SIS) is the most useful tool of operational
cooperation between the member states' police services. The need to
enhance its functions in SIS II and modernise its technical capabilities, in
order to incorporate the new member states, has been flanked by the
necessity to clarify its legal status. A decision must be taken on whether
or not to contract out its management to an external agency.
The EU and its member states are active in criminal law enforcement
globally but especially in their immediate neighbourhood. Police liaison
officers from the member states (who act on behalf of other member
states) are present in most sensitive regions of the world. Police technical
assistance programmes are now better coordinated between member
states. The role of civilian police has been recognised as crucial in
peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and the EU is now prepared,
through CIVPOL, for future missions. These activities implicate the
police in second pillar (Foreign and Security Policy) matters.ANDERSON & APAP
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To the extent that the external projection of EU law enforcement is
coordinated, it has a federating effect on the police, because of pressure
to present a common front to the outside world. This promotes trust
between the police forces of the EU. But external bilateral action by
member states can have the opposite effect, with the projection of
national models of policing and the promotion of potentially competitive
interests.
These four areas of activity, as well as Europol, have important overlaps
between them. They are, however, scattered over the three pillars of the
EU. This is a particular area in which future needs for coordination
between them should now be addressed.
4.4 Recommendations
1.  The principle of mutual recognition should remain the cornerstone of
future work on European judicial cooperation in civil matters. The
mutual recognition programme adopted by the Council should be
implemented. In particular, priority should be given to decisions
concerning uncontested claims, making it possible to establish a
genuine European Law Enforcement Order, and to certain judgements
concerning family law disputes, such as the cross-border right of
access to children.
2.  The setting of minimum standards for procedures for serving
documents, respecting the principles of member states’ laws, is a
logical precondition for the full application of the principle of mutual
recognition, and should be a priority.
3.  The proposal for the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor,
an independent judicial authority with powers of investigation into
and prosecution of criminal acts in all EU member states against the
Community's financial interests should be pursued with all due speed.
4.  The JHA Council/European Council should confirm its determination
to undertake, as soon and as ambitiously as possible, the exercise of
approximating definition of crimes and penalties for the offences
mentioned in the Amsterdam Treaty and in the Conclusions of the
Tampere European Council.
5.  The respective jurisdictions of the Community and the Union in
criminal matters should be clearly determined to avoid parallel
proposals for directives and framework decisions.FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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6.  Adequate systems of legal and political accountability should be
established for Europol prior to granting it additional operational
powers.
7.  The Council should request the Management Board of Europol to
reach an early conclusion to its discussions on corporate governance
and management control.
8.  The task given by the European Council to the Police Chiefs Task
Force to liase with intelligence services should continue to receive
strong political backing.
9.  Europol, CEPOL, the Police Chiefs Task Force, CIVPOL and
Schengen have important overlaps between them. Because they are
scattered over the three pillars of the EU, future needs for
coordination between them should now be addressed.54
CHAPTER 5
CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF JHA
The basic problem facing the further development of JHA cooperation is
constitutional. The present pillar structure of the EU is unsatisfactory and
unclear. The variety of legal instruments in each pillar, which are not
always the most suitable instruments for JHA, contributes to the
confusion. Ambiguity in the division of powers between the pillars as
well as within the pillars also characterises the current system. That
system should be replaced in the proposals for the next inter-
governmental conference by a simple division of powers – transferring a
maximum of competence to the first pillar, that is, to the Community
level, retaining a minimum of the most sensitive areas as the exclusive
responsibility of the member states, with some powers exercised
exclusively by the European institutions. The introduction of a system of
qualified majority voting is necessary for all JHA policies, allowing for
unanimity voting only for those issues that remain the exclusive
competence of the member states. The introduction of such a system is
particularly necessary after enlargement to avoid blockages in decision-
making, which could result in complete stalemate on some issues.
These suggestions are consistent with the development of the EU and
with the constitutional principles of federalism. They may not be adopted
– indeed, they probably will not – because of deep divisions of view
between the member states. Also, many among political elites, influential
opinion leaders and broad sections of the electorate are not ready to
believe that there are already important federal elements in the EU, and
are still less prepared to sanction them in this area.
If they are adopted, a clear scheme (even though the practicalities would
be complex) could be presented of those powers exercised by the
European institutions alone, those shared between the EU and the
member states and those reserved to the states. The powers attributed to
the EU alone could and should be very limited, restricted to offences
against the financial interests of the EU, counterfeiting the euro and to
many matters related to free movement, possibly including the crossing
of the external border of the EU. The second category (powers shared
between the Union and the member states) is the most difficult but, in
general terms, it should include all offences of a serious nature – included
in the list appended to the European Arrest Warrant – that involve two or
more member states. But the Union’s authority should be limited to
assisting the repression of crime, and the authority to legislate on criminalFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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matters should be reserved to the member states unless there is a specific
derogation to allow harmonised legislation. As in all statements of
constitutional principle, the precise meaning of this would be established
by practice over time, particularly in the area of shared competences.
Conflicts would inevitably arise and should be settled politically. The
European Council should, after receiving an opinion from the European
Court of Justice, decide on the basis of qualified majority voting. This
would avoid “government by judges” in sensitive matters touching state
sovereignty.
Such constitutional provisions would resolve, at least at the level of
principle, the problems of legal and political responsibility. Difficult
borderline cases would inevitably arise, but it would set out a distribution
of powers that would be comprehensible to everyone. It would also
identify clearly the roles of the ECJ and the European Parliament. The
problems would be many and severe, not least because of the practical
and political necessity of preserving various forms of flexibility and
possibly creating new forms. It would represent an important advance
over the present situation, which is a confusing and unclear transitional
regime. This chapter is devoted mainly to a presentation of the current
position with some suggestions for change in this transitional regime.
This regime could indeed last a long time even if the pillar structure is
formally abolished by the Treaty revision.
Since the entry into force of the single European act, the balance has been
moving from national towards European solutions in JHA; at first the
process was steady, but slow. This is unsurprising since it was the first
attempt by a supranational organisation to address problems such as
immigration or cooperation in criminal matters. The whole weight of
tradition and practice in ministries of justice and interior sustained a
preference for intergovernmental cooperation and the preservation of
sovereign control rather than harmonisation and common policies. The
European Commission conceded the necessity of the intergovernmental
method to make possible progress in the field. The loser was the
European Parliament, which was for the most part excluded from the
decision-making process, and important matters risked escaping robust
systems of accountability.
The institutional arrangement of the EU in the field of Justice and Home
Affairs is based on the distinction between matters that, as mentioned in
Chapter 1, have been brought under the first pillar and those that have
remained in the third. As the external dimension of JHA, with an
expanding number of international agreements, technical assistance
programmes and the deployment of civil police in internationalANDERSON & APAP
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peacekeeping missions, JHA is becoming increasingly involved in the
second pillar. Treaty changes have brought about a different allocation of
responsibilities. In the Treaty of Amsterdam, “visas, asylum, immigration
and other policies related to the free movement of persons”, such as
judicial cooperation in civil matters, are now subject to the Community
decision-making system (with derogations), whereas the decisions on
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the new Title VI of
TEU are still taken on an intergovernmental basis. The incorporation of
Schengen and the reform of third pillar decision-making promoted
changes in the working structure and practices of the Council in JHA.
Overall, justice and interior ministers have retained their power,
notwithstanding the attempts to reinforce the coordinating role of the
COREPER over the JHA galaxy.
The position of some aspects of JHA, under the first and third pillars,
must be reviewed, at the cost of straining the patience of the reader, to
illustrate the complexity and obscurity of the present situation. Progress
in matters under the first pillar has been both disappointing and slow
perhaps because decisions have direct effect. Under the third pillar, there
has been a great amount of activity perhaps because it is entirely within
the competence of the member states when, how and if they implement
decisions taken.
5.1 First pillar
5.1.1 Free movement
The new Title IV “Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related
to free movement of persons” is subject to special procedures providing
for derogation from the “community method” (Art. 67) of the rest of the
first pillar. In particular, in the decision-making process under this Title,
the Commission shares the right of initiative with the member states, and
the Parliament is only consulted. Moreover, apart from certain legislation
on visas, all the decisions have to be taken by a unanimous vote until 1
May 2004; at that date the Commission should regain its exclusive right
of initiative, and the decision-making process should shift to majority
voting. Before the latter step is taken, however, it will be necessary to
have a unanimous agreement of the member states.
It is currently enough to consult the European Parliament, but in the
future the Council could accept the co-decision procedure. However, it is
crucially important that, by transferring this competence to the first pillar,
the member states have implicitly recognised the authority of the
European Court of Justice.FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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5.1.2 The status of third-country nationals
On non-EU citizens, the Treaty of Amsterdam neither framed a coherent
strategy or a comprehensive approach in Arts 61, 62 and 63. New
objectives, which had to be achieved within a fixed timetable, were
assigned to the Community. Nonetheless, until the entry into force of the
Treaty of Amsterdam, third-country nationals (excepting some specific
categories) were not covered by the provisions of Community law.
The Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) (as amended by
the Treaty of Amsterdam which entered into force on 1 May 1999) does
not mention a common immigration policy, but lists some of the elements
of such a policy: “visas, asylum, immigration and other policies
connected with free movement of persons”. The competence accorded to
the EU in migration matters do not live up to the statement of the intent to
introduce a comprehensive and coherent immigration policy. Also the
second subparagraph of Art. 63 introduces a safeguard for the member
states, stipulating that they can pass (or maintain) national legislation
provided that such legislation is “compatible with this Treaty and with
international agreements”. Only recourse to Art. 308 (TEC) of the Treaty
establishing the European Community makes it possible to avoid a purely
intergovernmental approach, by transferring the provisions concerning
immigration policy from the third to the first pillar (Hailbronner, 1998). It
is difficult to establish which decisions will and should be taken at a
European level from a reading of the Treaty. The Treaty of Amsterdam
was therefore not the beginning of a comprehensive European
immigration policy but the first step towards such a goal.
Art. 61 of the Treaty of Amsterdam stipulates that the Council will adopt
“within a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of
Amsterdam the measures aiming to ensure free movement of persons in
compliance with Art. 14”; this illustrates the resistance of the member
states to rapid Europeanisation of the regulation of the movement of
third-country nationals within the EU. Art. 14 simply restates that the
Internal Market shall comprise an area without internal borders and that
within such area persons will have a right of free movement.
5.1.3 Entry into the European Union
Art. 62(2) – “measures concerning the crossing of the external borders of
the member states” - includes the sensitive issue of whether or not third-
country nationals need a visa to enter the European Union. It stipulates
that the Council may adopt “rules concerning the visas for the stay
envisaged of a maximum three-month duration”. Within this framework,
the Council is charged with the drawing up of a “black list” of countries,ANDERSON & APAP
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whose nationals will need a visa to cross the external borders and a
“white list” of countries exempted from such a requirement. The Council
has authority to adopt technical rules concerning the procedure for
issuing a visa and the specifications of a standard visa for the purpose of
bringing the systems of the various member states closer together.
The issuing of visas was already communitarised by the Maastricht
Treaty. However, the new wording helped solve the serious difficulties of
interpretation among JHA ministers. The adoption of Regulation 2317/95
of 25 September 1995, determined which third-country nationals must be
in possession of a visa when crossing an external border of the member
states. However, this was preceded by political wrangling about the limits
of the jurisdiction of the European Community. In the Treaty of
Maastricht the only power explicitly granted to the Union was to draw up
a list of those third-country nationals who require a visa to enter the
Union. This implied that member states reserved for themselves the
power to add to this joint list. The situation is, in principle, resolved by
Regulation No 539/2001 establishing a common list of those third
countries whose nationals require a visa and those who are exempted,
thus abolishing the discretion of member states to add other countries
which were not on the Common Visa list.
Art. 62(2) empowers the Community to frame a uniform visa, a measure
that would make it easier to identify illegal immigrants. But it does not
grant the power to determine the value of this visa in the member states,
despite the obligation appearing in Art. 14 to establish an area without
internal borders in which free movement of person is ensured. This issue
of detail, which could have important effects on individuals, illustrates
the need for a clearer definition of competences. However, the Art.
unambiguously stipulates that the measures adopted by the Council shall
ensure the absence of any controls on persons “be they citizens of the
Union or nationals of Third Countries” when they cross the internal
borders. In these articles, the concept of “persons” must be understood in
a broad sense. This broad meaning was not contained in the Treaty,
except in the form of granting a derogation to the United Kingdom and
Ireland enabling these two countries to maintain controls at their internal
borders with the other member states.
Thus, as a consequence of the entry into force of the Treaty of
Amsterdam, third-country nationals are not to be checked at the internal
borders (except in the case of the UK and Ireland). Furthermore, Art.
62(3) specifies that among the measures to be adopted by the Council are
those setting out the conditions for third-country nationals to move freely
within the territory of all member states for a maximum three-monthFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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duration. This has been aptly labelled as the right to travel by the
Commission. In fact, this provision does not entrust third-country
nationals with an individual (subjective) right of free movement.
Moreover, this provision does not at the moment have direct effect. Only
a privileged group of third-country nationals can benefit indirectly from
free movement rights of more than a three-month duration, through
derived rights. These third-country nationals include:
§  members of the family of an EU national;
§  nationals of states connected to the EU by an association or
cooperation agreement; and
§  workers of a company on whose behalf they carry out services in
another member state (according to the Vander Elst principles).
In March 2001, the Commission proposed to the Council a Directive
concerning long-term resident third-country nationals to extend their free
movement rights, on the basis of Art. 63(4) (Com 2001 127 final). The
Council has consulted the Parliament on the proposed Directive, but the
latter has not so far been adopted.
5.1.4 Residence in the European Union
Point (a) of Art. 63(3) covers “conditions of entry and residence, and
standards on procedures for the issue by member states of long term visas
and residence permits, including for the purpose of family reunion”. To
some degree, this provision can be considered a step backwards
compared with the Maastricht Treaty that included among the grounds for
the issue of long-term visas and residence permits “access to
employment”. No mention is made in the Treaty of Amsterdam of the
“harmonisation” of conditions of residence, contained in a text submitted
in December 1996 to the intergovernmental conference and in the plan
proposed in October 1996 by the Commission concerning an area of
freedom, security and justice (CONF 3912/96 of 18 September 1996).
Point (b) of Art. 63(3) is of a repressive nature; it covers “illegal
immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of illegal
residents”. The reference to illegal employment of third-country nationals
made in the Maastricht Treaty disappeared and this cannot be fortuitous.
The addition of repatriation of persons without authorised residence is
also significant, as individual member states have not managed to control
undocumented immigration. Certain states, some more than others,
tolerated the presence of undocumented migrants on their territory as
long as they did not seek recourse to public funds as they viewed these
persons as a source of cheap labour.ANDERSON & APAP
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Art. 63(4) covers “measures defining the rights and conditions under
which nationals of third country who are legally resident in one member
state” but again, the reference to the “right to seek employment in the
other member states” disappeared in the text adopted in Amsterdam.
After the first years of application of these articles, the Commission
forwarded to the Council proposals for various directives, for instance on
refugee status and conditions of residence, but none of them has been
adopted so far. These delays are mainly due to the necessity of reaching
unanimity to adopt the directives, complicated by the fact that many
member states prefer to approximate the existing national laws, which
makes it difficult to arrive at compromises acceptable to all.
The JHA Council of the 25 April 2002 reached agreement on the
proposed Directive on minimum standards for the reception of asylum
applicants. After the Directive is adopted, the member states will have
two years to implement it. Despite its general nature and the room for
exceptions or adaptation that it allows, it represents significant progress
because of the difficulties caused by different standards across the
member states. The Directive is among those, which the European
Council wants adopted without delay.
5.1.5 Fraud against the EU
One of the scandals of the European Community up until the last decade
was the varying severity with which fraud against EC funds was
prosecuted in the different member states. There were deep suspicions
that several states did not take the crime very seriously and that some
even connived in it. This has now changed. The protection of the
financial interests of the Community has become one of the major
priorities for the European institutions. Art. 280 (TEC) stipulates that “the
Community and the member states shall counter fraud and any other
illegal activities affecting the financial interest of the Community”. To
this end, the Council is called upon to adopt “the necessary measures […]
with a view to affording effective and equivalent protection in the
Member States”.
The activities covered concern customs fraud, misappropriation of
subsidies and tax evasion, insofar as the Community budget is affected by
it, as well as the fight against corruption and any other illegal activity
harmful to the financial interests of the Community. The European Anti-
Fraud Office (known by its French acronym – OLAF) was established in
1999 as a successor to the Task Force for the Coordination of fraud
prevention (UCLAF), which was created in 1988 as part of the
Secretariat-General of the Commission. Provision was made for OLAF’sFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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investigative independence; fraud prevention and safeguarding
Community interests against irregular behaviour likely to lead to
administrative or penal proceedings are also a part of its remit (EC
Decision 352/1999). Although OLAF has an independent status for its
investigative function, it is located in the European Commission and is
part of the responsibilities of the Commissioner in charge of the budget.
Its independence is safeguarded by the provision that the Director
General of the Office shall “neither seek nor take instructions from any
government or any other body (including the Commission)”. If the
Commission takes a measure that the Director General considers as a
threat to his independence, the latter is entitled to initiate legal
proceedings against the Commission before the European Court of
Justice. Also, the investigative function of OLAF is constantly scrutinised
by a Supervisory Committee, consisting of external experts independent
of the Community institutions. To this end, OLAF can carry out
administrative investigations inside the institutions (EC Decisions
1999/394 and 1999/396), the bodies and organs of the Community, in the
event of fraud harmful to the budget of the EU. As far as the
independence of OLAF’s in its investigative capacity is concerned, the
rule mirrors what is laid down in Art. 213 for Members of the
Commission.
In order to coordinate the prosecution against fraud of the interests of the
Communities, OLAF provides support for member states to assist close
and regular cooperation between the competent national authorities. The
work consists also of a pars construens, in that its know-how is utilised to
devise innovative and more effective anti-fraud methods.
OLAF has a series of powers (access to information and the buildings of
the Community institutions, the possibility to check accounts and to
obtain extracts of any document). In addition, the office can request from
any person concerned information that it judges useful for its
investigations. In accordance with the arrangements laid down in
Regulation N° 2185/96, it can carry out on-the-spot controls of the
economic actors concerned to acquire information concerning possible
irregularities. OLAF is not a “secret service”, nor a police force. Rather,
it is the legal instrument for administrative investigation to guarantee
better protection of Community interests and compliance with the law
against attacks from organised crime and frauds.
The main question is whether, in the longer term, this is sufficient. OLAF
has powers that parallel police power of access to documents and of
investigation. One of the advantages of abolishing the pillar structure and
to move towards a constitutional division of powers proposed above isANDERSON & APAP
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that OLAF could be merged with Europol. It is desirable that this be done
because Europol also has competence in the area of fraud. Lessons should
be drawn from the history of “turf battles” between US law enforcement
agencies and everything should be done to avoid this phenomenon.
5.2 Third pillar
Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters fall under the third
pillar (Title VI of the TEU). The stated objective of the Union in this area
is to provide a “high level of safety” by adopting common actions among
the member states in police and judicial cooperation and by preventing
racism and xenophobia. The relevant provisions are found in Arts 29-43
TEU, and particularly important is Art. 34, as it contains a list of the
available legal instruments. These are:
1.  Common Positions. These define the approach of the Union to a
specific topic, often related to external relations.
2.  Framework decisions and decisions adopted by the Council. These
instruments do not have direct effect, but are binding on the member
states.
3.  Conventions. These are ratified and implemented in accordance with
the constitutional provisions of the member states.
The adoption of the instruments is by unanimous vote and after the
consultation with the European Parliament; there is limited scope for
judicial review by the European Court of Justice. The record suggests that
they are not suited for ambitious legislative projects, if only because of
their lack of direct effect. The decisions often involve complex legal
arrangements and technicalities that need to be translated into national
laws down to the smallest detail, which is a very time-consuming process.
The only possibility of forcing a member state to implement a decision in
a reasonable time and being faithful to the original text would be through
proceedings brought before the Court of Justice by another member state
on the basis of Art. 227 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community. The latter entitles member states to bring the matter before
the Court of Justice if they consider “that another member state has failed
to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty”. It is highly unlikely that
member states will initiate legal action against each other, for fear of
retaliatory action.
Developments in transnational crime and reactions to the “problem” of
immigration have resulted in the creation of new institutions/agencies
with law enforcement tasks. As in other fields of European integration,
however, the creation of such agencies has been ad hoc. The result hasFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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been defined as “an opaque and complex patchwork of institutions
(official or otherwise), agreements and structures, which aim to promote
different forms of cooperation” (Bruggeman, 2000). The current situation
is characterised by partly overlapping competences, areas in which the
authorities can exercise their powers and functional specialisation, as well
as by the absence of clear and coherent coordination, and the lack of
accountability and democratic control. On the positive side, Justice and
Home Affairs cooperation encourage national administrations to
restructure their criminal justice organisation (police, customs and public
prosecution) in order to facilitate transnational cooperation. Therefore,
although at the moment police legislation, penal law and criminal
procedure still differ widely from one country to another, reforms are
implemented or discussed in many member states.
5.2.1 Europol
Europol was the first organisation established in the third pillar. Its
purpose is to strengthen police and customs cooperation for preventing
and combating crime in fields such as terrorism, drugs trafficking and
other serious forms of international crime, chiefly through the central
exchange and analysis of information and intelligence. The role of
Europol is limited to intelligence-handling, support and coordination. Its
role in supporting joint teams of investigators is potentially important but
these have not gone beyond the consultation stage. A right to initiate
investigations is envisaged and discussed in various Councils, but this
step has not yet been taken.
Europol is based on the Convention of July 1995, but also comes within
the scope of Arts 29, 30 and 31 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Art. 29
TEU, contains a list of common matters of interest, introduced as a
response to the criticisms concerning the loose nature of the Trevi group
which had previously been the locus of police cooperation. This list
contains general objectives open to broad interpretation, and do not
define the various crimes with a European dimension against which
common action should be taken. The mandate of Europol specified in the
Convention originally included preventing and combating terrorism,
unlawful drug-trafficking, trafficking in human beings, crimes involving
clandestine immigration networks, illicit trafficking in radioactive and
nuclear substances, illicit vehicle trafficking, combating the
counterfeiting of the euro and money-laundering associated with
international criminal activities.
These original provisions have been extended by a series of Council
decisions. On 29 April 1999, the Council adopted a decision extendingANDERSON & APAP
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Europol's mandate to deal with forgery of money and means of payment.
On 30 November 2000, the Council adopted an act drawing up, on the
basis of Art. 43(1) of the Convention on the establishment of a European
Police Office (Europol Convention), a Protocol amending Art. 2 and the
Annex to that Convention. This extends Europol's powers to money
laundering in general, regardless of the type of offence from which the
laundered proceeds originate. On 30 November 2000, the Council
adopted a recommendation to member states in respect of Europol's
assistance to joint investigative teams set up by the member states. In this
document, the Council describes how Europol can assist joint
investigative teams and recommends that the member states make full use
of these possibilities.
The creation of a team of counter-terrorism specialists (Council Decision,
25 September 2001) to which the member states are invited to appoint
liaison officers from police and intelligence services experienced in the
fight against terrorism without prejudice to the legislation by which they
are governed, also represented an important new step. Finally, on 1
January 2002, the mandate was extended to cover all forms of serious
crime. This will not necessarily increase the number of tasks for Europol
but will allow greater flexibility in using data relevant to organised crime.
This summary of measures shows how the scope of Europol's mandate
has been steadily broadened, giving rise to two orders of problems. First,
Europol has not yet sufficient resources to fulfil its tasks. With a budget
of € 30 million and approximately 300 officials at headquarters in the
Hague, it is not in a position to cover the full range of criminal
intelligence, let alone to perform the tasks in future of initiating and
participating in investigations of the member states. Second, the national
authorities have so far failed to provide adequate criminal intelligence for
Europol to demonstrate its value.
Art. 30 TEU contains two provisions, which could be the beginnings of
operational powers for Europol. Paragraph 2 a) stipulates that the Council
shall “enable Europol to facilitate and support the preparation […] of
investigative actions by the competent authorities of the Member States”.
The provision envisages Europol officials joining member states’
operational police actions in a support capacity. However, Art. 30
provides for a five-year period before the Council actually has to
implement this, which, as mentioned above, it does not seem eager to do
so. Additional legislation is needed, in order to establish the legal status
of Europol personnel while performing support functions, which could
entail participating in searches and questioning of suspects. Paragraph 2
b) allows, after appropriate legislation is adopted, Europol to ask theFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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member states to conduct and coordinate investigations. Member states
would not be obliged to comply with the request, but there would be clear
moral pressure on states to do so. Transforming Europol into an FBI-type
organisation is not practical as long as the essential flanking instruments
are not put in place (EU penal law, EU procedural law, European Court,
etc.). Euro counterfeiting is the first criminal offence in which it is
possible to envisage a European criminal jurisdiction and law
enforcement capacity. On the very point of euro counterfeiting, the
ambiguity arises whether this is really in the remit of Europol or whether
it shouldn't be mainly OLAF's competence.
At the JHA Council of 28 February 2002, it was acknowledged that
“broad agreement exists for Europol participation in joint investigative
teams and Europol's right to ask member states to launch investigations in
specific cases”. To entrust the agency with such powers, it is necessary to
amend the Europol Convention, which requires a complex procedure. The
ministers could not reach an agreement on the best possible way to
simplify this procedure (three proposals were put forward, the most
radical being the replacement of the entire Europol Convention with a
Council decision which in the future could be amended by another
Council decision). The stalemate was not broken at the JHA Council on
the 25 April 2002, so the agreement on Europol's possibility to participate
in joint investigations may take the form of a protocol to the Europol
Convention, a procedure likely to take several years.
The extension of Europol's mandate will make it all the more necessary to
have adequate forms of accountability and control. This has given rise to
a “chicken-and-egg” debate – whether improved forms of control should
come before operational powers for Europol to show that they work or
should be introduced after the extension of the mandate to avoid
undermining the effectiveness of the organisation by burdening it with
too – heavy accountability procedures. This is probably a false debate
because accountability and effectiveness should go hand in hand.
The various forms of control are included in the Europol Convention. The
latter provides for:
1.  Political accountability: the Management Board has to report regularly
to the Ministers.
2.  Budgetary control: accounts are supervised by three institutions, an
independent private undertaking, financial controllers, and experts
from the member states.
3.  Judicial control: the legality of activities is weakly controlled by the
European Court of Justice. A protocol allows the member states to optANDERSON & APAP
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in with respect to the jurisdiction of the ECJ.
These forms of scrutiny are not satisfactory when and if the competence
of Europol is broadened. For example, political accountability is ensured
by the relation of the Management board to the Council, but the Council
is not the appropriate body. The weakness of the democratic
accountability of the Council itself is a feature of the EU that undermines
its legitimacy in the eyes of many informed EU citizens. European
Parliamentary control is desirable and this could take two forms. The first
option would be to integrate Europol into the first pillar under the
responsibility of a Commissioner. This is unlikely to be acceptable to the
member states. Some progress has been made so far under the third pillar
in parliamentary control and an amendment of the Europol Convention
could provide for strengthened parliamentary control by making Europol
formally accountable to the EP.
More important from the point of view of guarantees of individual rights,
there is no judicial protection at the Union level against Europol's
activities. Proceedings can theoretically be brought before the national
courts, but this is a difficult option to exercise, especially if the Europol
officials involved are of another nationality. As a consequence of the
inadequacy of control, police autonomy has been expanded.
Scrutiny and control should not hinder the operational capabilities of
Europol; control “needs to be effective but not abusive”. The Director of
Europol has recently complained about the constraints on the work of his
agency represented by the loose controls already in place. Law
enforcement officials habitually complain about controls, which
illustrates the enduring conflict between freedom and security and
between public order and individual freedom.
In the near future, particular attention should be given to determining
relations between national prosecuting authorities, Eurojust, Europol,
Commission (OLAF) and the European Judicial Network (EJN – see
below).
5.2.2 Eurojust and the European Judicial Network
Eurojust has been set up to smooth the way and to help coordinate
investigation and prosecution of serious cross-border crime. Proposed at
the Tampere meeting of the European Council in October 1999, the
agency got under way (Council Decision 2000/799/JHA) as a provisional
judicial cooperation unit, gathering prosecutors from all member states.
These were “supported by the infrastructures of the Council” and worked
in “close cooperation with the General Secretariat and the EJN”. EurojustFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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was formally established by Council Decision 2002/187/JHA on 28
February 2002. It is located in The Hague with Europol and is to
coordinate with investigating and prosecuting officials from the member
states, Europol and other agencies. The new unit raises the long-term
prospect Eurojust one day of bringing public criminal prosecutions for
trial at the European Court of Justice.
At the moment, Eurojust neither implies change in national legislation
nor harmonises them. It helps national judges and prosecutors in cross-
border cases, working alongside the European Judicial Network (EJN),
which became operational earlier (in 1998). The main difference between
the two is that EJN is a decentralised network that links EU lawyers and
judges working on criminal cases to help them exchange information
rapidly and effectively, whereas Eurojust is a centralised unit. EJN has
designated specialists in all member states, which can be contacted and
asked for advice.
Eurojust gives immediate legal advice and assistance in cross-border
cases to the investigators, prosecutors and judges in the member states. It
advises judges and prosecutors where to look for information and on how
to proceed in cross-border cases. It handles “letters rogatory”, which are a
formal request from a court in one country to the appropriate judicial
authorities in another for testimony or other documentary evidence. It
also cooperates with OLAF, in cases affecting the EU's financial
interests.
Eurojust is composed of senior lawyers, magistrates, prosecutors, judges
and other legal experts seconded from every member state. They keep
their status as members of the national organisations or corps from
whence they come, and draw their salaries from the member states.
Members have an expert knowledge of the legal systems of their country,
have rapid access to them and can engage in direct dialogue with the
national authorities. They can immediately consult other team members,
and advice is, if necessary, given collectively from the whole team and
not simply from one individual. They have the further advantage of
having an overall view of what is going on in their domain throughout the
EU.
The EJN is a parallel organisation, which engages in similar activities,
but it takes a different form and has a different modus operandi. It
comprises contact points in every member state and holds meetings of
these twice a year. It has a dedicated telecommunications network and its
own permanent secretariat (now part of the Eurojust secretariat). Contact
points informally expedite requests for assistance in criminal
investigations or prosecutions (international judicial orders or “lettersANDERSON & APAP
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rogatory”) and the network provides up-to-date information on the
different procedures and laws in the member states. Meetings of the EJN
cover EU policy on judicial cooperation, international criminal case
studies and the development of practical cooperation.
The EJN is a non-threatening arrangement and the only question mark
hanging over it is its usefulness when Eurojust gets fully under way. The
debate on the establishment of Eurojust highlighted three controversial
areas – powers, relations with other institutions and accountability
On the first, the powers of Eurojust were disputed among the member
states. The Art. 36 Committee meeting on 6 April 2000 acknowledged
that certain delegations wanted a “light” Eurojust while others insisted on
the full implementation of the Tampere Conclusions. The result was a
compromise. When acting as a college, Eurojust will be entitled to ask
the competent authorities to “undertake an investigation or prosecution of
specific acts” (Art. 7 (a)(i) of the Council Decision setting up Eurojust) or
to “set up a joint investigation team in keeping with the relevant
cooperation instruments” (Art. 7 (a)(iv) of the above-mentioned
decision). However, the authorities of the member states can refuse to
comply with such a request. The grounds for refusal are not laid down, so
the national authorities cannot be held accountable for non-compliance.
Moreover, it is not necessary to provide a reason if this “would jeopardise
the success of investigations under way or the safety of individuals” (Art.
8 (iii)). Loose exemptions of this kind are likely to undermine the system,
because prosecutors can easily claim to be at different stages of
investigations, or they might have different views as to the further steps
to take.
Certain improvements should be made quickly. After a fixed transitional
period, any national authority not following a recommendation by
Eurojust should be obliged to provide a reasoned justification for this
within a reasonable time. In addition, Eurojust will only be able to
contribute effectively to coordination of prosecution activities if it is
sufficiently informed. It must therefore be able to issue binding
information requests to national prosecution authorities.
Second, Eurojust is obliged to coordinate with other institutions, but the
way in which this will be done is not yet clear. Eurojust is required by
Art. 26 (of the Council Decision setting up Eurojust) to establish and
maintain close cooperation with Europol, and to “take into account the
need to avoid duplication of effort”.
The privileged relations with the European Judicial Network are based on
consultation and complementarity. The Judicial Network and Eurojust areFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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complementary and should function harmoniously together. Any possible
“competition” or conflicts of responsibility or wasteful duplication of
work should be avoided as far as possible.
Eurojust is also required to establish and maintain close cooperation with
OLAF. OLAF should contribute to Eurojust's work to coordinate
investigations and prosecution procedures, although national authorities
must tacitly agree by not opposing this contribution. Indeed, member
states may not want a supranational body (the Commission, of which
OLAF is a part) to interfere with national investigations. The
Commission's Communication of 28 June 2000 announced a judicial
support unit, composed of experts with experience as magistrates or
prosecutors, in OLAF to give support and assistance to the judicial
authorities of the member states. Cooperation between OLAF and
Eurojust will be required in this to ensure both the avoidance of potential
overlap and to maximise effectiveness.
A controversial topic concerning the powers of Eurojust, not expressly
referred to in the decision establishing it, concerns access to the Schengen
Information System. The proposal that Eurojust should be given access to
the SIS immediately gave rise to concerns about the indirect access that
Europol would enjoy (through the exchange of information). Council's
Decision simply refers to “any information that is necessary for
[Eurojust] to carry out its tasks”, without specifying whether it is entitled
to ask for data contained in the SIS. Members of Eurojust, in accordance
with their national law, are “empowered to consult the criminal record”
database, and (subject to the same reservations) should be able to access
the SIS (Art. 8, 3). When acting within their own territories, Eurojust
officials will be subject to national law and procedure. The question of
them acting in another state is alluded to in terms of mutual recognition:
“Each Member State shall define the nature and extent of the powers it
grants its national member in its own territory. The other Member States
shall undertake to accept and recognise the prerogatives thus conferred”
(Art. 8(2)).
Third, the provisions on accountability in the Council's decision are
minimal. Indeed, Eurojust was the creation of officials, under the sole
control of national Ministers, a process that gave rise to preoccupations
by defenders of civil liberties. Eurojust adopts its own rules of procedure,
and only has to report to the JHA Council in writing once a year. A report
will be communicated to the European Parliament but the wording of Art.
32 of the Council Decision of 28 February 2002 on the setting up of
Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime doesANDERSON & APAP
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not make clear whether it will be the same report the Council receives, or
a shorter and less informative one.
Eurojust can be seen as a judicial counterpart of Europol, but this does
not imply judicial supervision of Europol – only that Europol’s activities
need to be backed up and complemented by coordination of prosecutions.
In the long-term, however, these institutions may be an embryonic federal
system for justice and law enforcement. This would require a common
penal code. A first starting point for this is Art. 31 TEU, which stipulates
the progressive adoption of measures “establishing minimum rules
relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties”. In
the JHA Council of 28 February 2002, ministers declared that it is still
too early for such radical innovations as a European Public Prosecutor
and a Common (basic) Penal Code, but with the institution of Eurojust
the road is open. The possibility of such long-terms developments makes
it paramount to strengthen the political and democratic controls on
Eurojust and other agencies.
5.2.3 Recommendations
The cornerstones to the construction of an area of freedom, security and
justice have been laid. For this foundation to be solid foundation,
however, a balance between freedom, security and justice must be struck
and given constitutional underpinning. With this objective in view, we
make the following recommendations:
1.  All legislative proposals, declarations and agreements in JHA should
be explicitly based on respect for human rights. This should become
the fundamental normative basis for each practice, (legal) instrument,
institution and process within AFSJ.
2.  The EU Charter on Fundamental Rights should be included in the
Constitution or Constitutional Treaty being developed for Europe.
The EU as a polity should have a status equivalent to that of signatory
States to the European Convention on Human Rights.
3.  A particular danger at the moment arises from populist discourse and
feelings of “insecurity” leading to a “big-brother type” surveillance
society. Fundamental rights and freedoms, and democratic rights
should be re-affirmed. Data protection should be given particular
importance as intrusions into personal privacy may increase: uniform
standards of protection should be introduced in all countries
participating in international data-exchange systems.
4.  The AFSJ should promote inclusiveness. In particular, candidate
countries should be involved to allow them, prior to accession, anFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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influence over decisions; third-country nationals should benefit more
from free movement provisions within the EU.
5.  Democratic control should be consolidated in JHA by the following
actions:
-  All Parliaments be given adequate and timely information.
-  The European Parliament and the national parliaments should
reinforce inter-parliamentary cooperation.
-  Co-decision between the Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament should become the general practice for all JHA matters.
-  Institutions that exchange sensitive information, such as Europol
and Eurojust, should be subject to tighter democratic control.
National models for parliamentary control on policing activities
could adapted to the EU-level.
6.  Judicial control should be enhanced by widening the competences of
the European Court of Justice with regard to Title VI matters. A
European Judicial Area should be gradually established containing
the following core elements:
-  A European Criminal Court
-  A European Public Prosecutor
-  A European Defence Lawyer
-  Eurobail
-  Eurocrimes and a European Criminal (Procedure) Law
-  These elements may be considered as complementary to a future
extension of Europol’s mandate with an operational one.
7.  Measures should be taken to make EU institutions function more
efficiently:
-  The Council working methods should be revised and rationalised.
-  Inter-pillar cooperation should be further encouraged, especially to
clarify roles and responsibilities concerning crisis management,
drugs and data-protection.
-  Performance indicators should be developed for the executive
agencies Europol and Eurojust in order to enhance their efficiency
and accountability.
-  When the pillar structure of the EU is abolished, OLAF should beANDERSON & APAP
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merged with Europol.
-  An amendment of the Europol Convention should provide for
strengthened democratic accountability by making Europol
formally accountable to the European Parliament.
-  Attention should be given to defining relations and clarifying
systems of coordination between national prosecuting authorities,
Eurojust, Europol, Commission (OLAF) and the European Judicial
Network.
-  After a fixed transitional period, a national authority failing to
follow a recommendation by Eurojust should provide a reasoned
justification within a specified period. Eurojust should be
empowered to issue binding requests for information to national
prosecution authorities.
8.  Civil society should participate in the debate about the current and
future developments in the AFSJ to help to disseminate information,
to promote a broad consensus amongst citizens about measures in
JHA and to strengthen the social legitimacy of AFSJ.
9.  Subsidiarity should remain the basic principle for the division of
powers and competences between EU institutions and the national,
regional or local law enforcement authorities.73
CHAPTER 6
GAZING INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL
he previous chapters have been mainly devoted to what should
happen in developing the area of freedom, security and justice.
This conclusion is concerned with possible future policy directions.
Making statements about the future, especially in this field, is notoriously
hazardous, but the reason for imagining the future is to plan strategies
that prevent the development of undesirable states of affairs.
The agenda in JHA is highly susceptible to political shocks.
Parliamentarians and governments are too often influenced by “the
politics of the last outrage”. When will the next outrage take place, and
what its nature will be is impossible to predict. The last influential
outrage, 11 September 2001, is a graphic illustration of this point. This
was unexpected and had many important consequences in international
relations and security policy. Other shocks will inevitably occur.
Regardless of whether counter-terrorism remains the driving force behind
EU security cooperation, the aftermath of September 11
th will be with us
for some time to come. Its long-term effects can be grouped under ten
headings:
1.  The impact of September 11 could help to correct the current
imbalance between an ambitious political agenda and the actual
institutional capacity to deliver results. This will help to promote two
of the core values identified in Chapter 3 – efficiency, especially in
the decision-making processes of the EU, and better operational
coordination. When clear political will is shown, as over the decision
to accept the principle of the European Arrest Warrant, important
decisions can be taken. The European Arrest Warrant is a very
significant step as it is one of the first concrete instances of mutual
recognition in penal matters at European level. Others, such as
facilitating the transfer of evidence and the seizure of assets, have
followed. These have set precedents that will be followed. Necessary
practical steps will eventually include an overhaul of the working
procedures in the Council of Ministers and re-opening the debate
about an extension of qualified majority voting to most areas of JHA,
including police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which is
still firmly in the grip of the unanimity rule. September 11 will
therefore emerge as one of the starting points for treaty reform in
JHA, aimed at increasing the EU’s decision-making capacity.
2.  The profile of EU coordinating mechanisms in counter-terrorism has
TANDERSON & APAP
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been considerably enhanced – particularly Europol (especially its
anti-terrorist unit), the Working Group of Chiefs of Police and
Eurojust, regular meetings with the US authorities and EU-sponsored
meetings of heads of security services. These effects are likely to
endure and have knock-on effects over the whole spectrum of
criminal law enforcement issues. This will promote the core value of
efficiency in terms of credibility and effectiveness of these EU
institutions in their relationships with national law enforcement
systems. There is pressure to refine and extend the mandate of the EU
law enforcement units. As soon as they are institutionally secure, like
all bureaucracies with political support, they will press for increases
in their resources, establishments and powers. This will introduce
additional elements in the complex area of treaty revision and
constitution-building in the EU. A clarification of the lines of political
and legal responsibility is particularly important in police and judicial
cooperation and this will be an increasingly important theme in the
EU policy debate. However, member states, especially some small
states, are likely to defend their sovereign rights in such a way that
this desirable objective will be very difficult to achieve.
3.  The clear reluctance of member states to agree to harmonisation of
criminal law and criminal law procedure will probably not change in
the short-term. The combination of nationalism and the conservatism
of legal establishments represents a formidable barrier to change. In
this area, promoting the basic core value of trust, discussed in Chapter
3, is essential. The practical effect of the lack of trust is that most of
the EU-level decisions remain in the category of “soft” law – texts
with the appearance of law but which the courts cannot apply. Among
the main categories are conventions negotiated under international
law, which, even when ratified, do not enter the municipal law of
most member states unless some form of legislative action is taken;
still less do they form a part of European law. Action plans, the most
celebrated of which is the action plan on organised crime, common
positions such as that on terrorism, recommendations and new third-
pillar instruments introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam fall into
this category. Since some member states have a poor record in
implementing first-pillar directives, implementation rates of third-
pillar instruments is likely to be mediocre or poor. This will lead to
cynicism about the European Union, punctuated by occasional
attempts to improve levels of implementation.
4.  What happens to these categories of soft law depends on future
political shocks and the general political support for the EU. The EU
Council may decide that some of the rules and recommendations inFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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this domain should be made justiciable, enforceable in the courts. The
member states did this (after a transitional period) in the Treaty of
Amsterdam by simply transferring immigration and asylum policy
from the third to the first pillar. They could extend what is understood
by these headings to issues such as management and control of the
external frontier. Or they may decide that a new instrument in JHA
should be given a basis in European law. One of the most frequently
mentioned is executive police powers for Europol, as it gains a
greater presence in operational policing. The debate about this is
likely to be long and difficult, based explicitly on sovereignty
concerns and implicitly about lack of trust.
5.  The European Court of Justice may engage in some creative
jurisprudence; the ECJ established the supremacy of European
economic law and its direct effect in the member states in a series of
landmark judgements, and it has extended the domain of EU law
beyond the strict limits of the treaties. It already is accorded the
competence by most member states to give the authoritative
interpretation of third-pillar conventions. It could expand the area
understood by free movement, immigration and asylum and even
other areas such as money laundering to give the EU greater criminal
law competence. It is unlikely that the ECJ would repeat the
extension of EU criminal law competence in the same way as in
economic law, unless a clear political consensus emerges to do so, but
some movement in this direction may be expected.
6.  On budgeting, September 11 may, along with other things, serve as
an incentive to increase EU spending on JHA and reduce the
imbalance between objectives and financial means. At the very least,
one would expect new programmes of training, research and know-
how transfer as well as new pilot projects being introduced in the area
of the fight against terrorism. Such new programmes could give the
EU some authority to monitor whether minimum standards of
performance are met by member states. This will certainly have
implications for other areas of repression of serious crime. The
authority and resources of the Bundeskriminalamt increased rapidly
as a result of terrorist activity in Germany in the 1970s and did not
diminish thereafter. This may be replicated at the European level.
However, increased spending on JHA crucially depends on what
happens to other budgetary headings, such as the Common
Agricultural Policy. No pressure to increase overall EU expenditure is
probable.
7.  An important impact of September 11, along with other pressuresANDERSON & APAP
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such as difficulties about American involvement in the Balkan
peacekeeping missions, is likely to be a better balance and better
coordination between internal and external EU action. The terrorist
attacks highlighted in a dramatic way the global dimension and the
need for the EU to play a more active role in international action and
cooperation. The Council has also decided to sustain a more active
role for the EU in relevant JHA areas in the UN context. The US is
the first bilateral partner, and the EU has already engaged in a number
of measures to upgrade cooperation. While this cooperation has
problematic aspects – such as the question of the adequate protection
of personal data provided by the EU to the US, the death penalty in
the US and the legal rights of EU nationals held in Guantanamo Bay
– there can be no doubt that it marks a new departure in external
action. The involvement of representatives of a third country in EU
cooperation structures and mechanisms is an important new feature. It
is a particular sign of solidarity with the US, which may not be easily
transferable to relations with other third-countries. The EU has put
pressure on a number of third countries for more cooperation in the
fight against the financing of terrorism. Taken together these amounts
to a new dynamism within the EU in the external security dimension
of the AFSJ.
8.  Greater clarity in the methods of external cooperation will become a
priority. The many different frameworks of cooperation are a
hindrance. These include: a common strategy and an overall action
plan (Ukraine), a targeted action plan (Russia – organised crime), a
stability pact, a stabilisation and association process (Balkans), a
common strategy and the Barcelona process (Mediterranean), an
informal dialogue alongside the Task Force or the Joint Cooperation
Committee (United States, Canada), and common approaches or joint
positions within international organisations. The picture is further
complicated by the number of international fora (Council of Europe,
United Nations, Financial Action Task Force, G8, Special
Conferences, etc.) in which the EU is present. Member states also
take initiatives, reducing the visibility of EU actions still further. The
instruments for providing assistance to cooperative actions are also
complex, to mention only obvious examples: regional programmes,
action plans, regional cooperation, and the methods used – MEDA
(Financial support for the Euromed partnership), TACIS (Support for
transformation in East Europe and Central Asia) and shortly CARDS
(Assistance for the Western Balkans). The external relations of JHA
would be clearer if they were part of a more integrated, overall
approach that was understood by those responsible at the technicalFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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level, as well as the press and parliamentarians in the member states.
A regular assessment of each priority set out on a list, as is already
the practice for the Balkans, is a highly probable development.
Pressure for these approaches is likely to increase. To refer again to
the core values identified in Chapter 3, improved coordination
between the various programmes and instruments is essential.
9.  Management of the external frontier has acquired, and will continue
to have greater salience, especially if terrorist incidents happen inside
the EU or further attacks on the US are partially planned in Europe,
or if undocumented immigration continues to be high on the political
agenda. This will draw much needed attention to the very complexity
of the issues involved – the very different conditions pertaining to
different sections and different ports of entry to the EU, the very
different kinds and categories of people seeking to enter the EU, the
number and sensitivity of tasks at border check points and the varying
perceptions and political significance of border controls. The
disruptive effects of upgrading border controls and migration
management systems at the future external border should not be
overestimated – a tendency among states neighbouring the EU and
some academic analysts. Certainly if there are more rigorous personal
checks on every individual seeking entry to the EU and if all goods
crossing the external frontier are subject to detailed physical
examination, the results will be disastrous. But if intelligence is
upgraded and ways of filtering out any suspect individuals are
improved, disruption can be kept to a minimum. All too often, the
Justice and Home Affairs aspect of the enlargement process,
particularly the requirement for candidate states to adopt Schengen
norms, has been depicted in wholly negative terms. Images are
conjured up of Fortress Europe or of a new Iron Curtain dropping
across Eastern Europe, disrupting relationships between countries that
have hitherto enjoyed close ties. The reality is entirely different. The
Union’s objective is to construct an area of peace, stability and
prosperity, which extends beyond the borders of the enlarged Union.
However, the perceptions of the citizens of the relatively poor states
neighbouring the EU are not likely to believe in this benign vision,
unless flexible ways are introduced for handling local border traffic.
Despite pressures to upgrade the management of the external border,
progress on the setting up of a “European Border Police” is likely to
be slow but increased emphasis on common training standards,
information-sharing, liaison officers and assistance to member states
facing difficulties are fairly certain. These will promote trust,
efficiency and improved coordination.ANDERSON & APAP
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10. A danger of the aftermath of 11 September and the current
preoccupation with undocumented immigration and terrorism is that a
dynamic may be established that leads to an over-securitisation of
European society with adverse effects on the internal cohesion of
European societies. In particular, certain minority groups could feel
as they already do in some cases, that they were subject to excessive
attention by security forces. Also the legitimacy of the fight against
terrorism can be used to undermine legality at the national and EU
levels. Anti-terrorist legislation inevitably diminishes individual
rights, and this legislation can be abused. In addition, the
discretionary powers of police and security agencies can be extended,
and increased latitude given to these agencies can seem, in an
atmosphere of fearful public opinion, to be justified. The EU, the
member states and law enforcement agencies generally will be
reminded, by parliamentarians and civil liberties groups, of the
European Council’s declaration on 21 September 2001 that the
objective of these efforts to combat terrorism is a world of tolerance,
peace and rule of law. The procedural and substantive rights of
individuals should be protected with even greater vigilance in the new
circumstances. However, some of the bodies and meetings set up
after 11 September and some information exchange have no secure
legal basis. It will be impossible to build a Europe of the rule of law if
in the process the fundamental principles of this rule are disregarded.
°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°
The road to establish a genuine Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is
still a long one. But a dynamic has been established which is neither
desirable nor possible to stop. This area will need constant attention,
particularly as the inevitable attempts to shore up national sovereignty
result in the perverse effects of undermining accountability and the rule
of law. It is an area in which there should be active citizen participation,
increased transparency of decision-making, and a constant effort on the
part of authorities at all levels to inform and explain. These conditions are
extremely difficult to fulfil.79
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ANNEX 1
DIVISION OF COMPETENCES
BETWEEN THE 1
ST & 3
RD PILLARS
First Pillar
EU institutions (EU Commission, EU Parliament, EU Council and the
European Court of Justice) in shared competence with the EU member
states (with the exception of Denmark, UK and Ireland) govern the area
of freedom, security and justice which since 1 May 1999, is in the first
pillar.
Title IV (Arts 61-69)
Control of the External Borders
Asylum
Immigration Policy and the Rights of Third-Country Nationals
Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters
+
OLAF (to Combat Cross-Border Fraud and Corruption based on Art. 280)ANDERSON & APAP
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Third Pillar
The 15 member states
govern the third pillar which covers police and judicial cooperation in
penal matters.
The main competence lies with National Ministries of Justice and
Interior.
Agencies at European Level:
Europol Eurojust
Cepol European Judicial
Network (EJN)
Task Force of
Police Chiefs
Joint Investigation
Teams
They second to European Agencies:
National Police/Customs Officials
1
National Prosecutors/ Judges/Magistrates
                                                                
1 Most customs coordination and liaison takes place, when they are acting in
their revenue-collection capacity, under pillar 1.89
ANNEX 2
PROVISIONS IN THE JHA ACQUIS: 1ST AND 3RD PILLAR
EU First Pillar Matters in the Area of Freedom, Security & Justice
Following a vote in the Council in 2004, the European Parliament will
have co-decision powers and there will be a greater role for the European
court of justice. Decision-making will become by qualified majority
voting in all these matters. Until now there is a shared competence in
policy-making between the EU institutions and member states.
Title IV (Arts 61-69)
Crossing of External Borders
•  List of countries whose nationals are subject to the visa
requirement
•  Airport transit arrangements
•  Uniform Community format for visas
•  Convention on the control of individuals
•  Pre-frontier assistance and training assignments
•  Local consular cooperation regarding visas
•  Counterfeit travel documents: exchange of information
•  Detection of forged documents
•  FADO Image Archiving System
Asylum Policy
•  Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on Asylum
(CIREA)
•  Conditions governing eligibility for refugee status or
international protection
•  Definition of the term refugee
•  Determining the member state responsible for examining an
asylum application (Council Regulation)
•  Convention determining the State responsible for examining
applications for asylum: Dublin Convention
•  “Eurodac” system
•  Minimum standards on the reception of applicants for asylum
•  Minimum guarantees for asylum procedures
•  Minimum guarantees for procedures for granting and
withdrawing refugee status
•  Criteria for rejecting unfounded applications for asylumANDERSON & APAP
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•  Burden-sharing (1996)
•  Financing of specific projects (1997-1998)
•  Reception and voluntary repatriation of refugees, displaced
persons and asylum applicants (1999)
•  Programme to promote the integration of refugees
•  Temporary protection in case of mass influx of displaced persons
•  Monitoring instruments already approved
•  Admission of third-country nationals to the member states for
study purposes
•  Unaccompanied minors who are nationals of third countries
•  Monitoring the implementation of instruments concerning
admission, clandestine immigration and expulsion
Immigration Policy and the Rights of Third-Country Nationals
Immigration Policy
•  Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the
Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (Cirefi)
•  Coordination of the Community immigration policy
•  Uniform format for residence permits
•  Assistance for the voluntary repatriation of third-country
nationals
•  Convention on the admission of third-country nationals to the
member states
•  Marriages of convenience
•  Expulsion of third-country nationals
•  Mutual recognition of expulsion decisions
•  Readmission agreements
•  Obligations as between member states in matters concerning
readmission
•  Preventing the facilitation of unauthorised entry and residence
•  Financial penalties imposed on carriers
•  Combating illegal immigration and employment
•  Limitations on the admission of third-country nationals for the
purpose of pursuing activities as self-employed persons
•  Limitations on the admission of third-country nationals for
employment
Rights of Third-Country Nationals
•  Free movement for periods not exceeding three months and
specific authorisation
•  Conditions of entry and residence for third-country nationals
•  Right of third-country nationals to travelFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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•  Freedom of movement with a long-stay visa
•  Long-term residents
•  Council Directive relating to long-term resident status
•  School pupils from third countries
•  Family reunification
•  Free provision of services
o  Posting of employees from third countries by
undertakings for the provision of cross-border services
•  Extension of free movement of cross-border services to self-
employed nationals of a third country established within the
Community
Fight against Cross-Border Corruption (Art. 280 Of TEC)
•  OLAF (the antifraud organisation)
•  Union policy against corruption
•  Corruption involving European Community officials or national
civil servants
•  Corruption in the private sector
•  Negotiations in the Council of Europe and the OECD regarding
action against corruption
•  Combating fraud and counterfeiting of means of payment
•  Preventing fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of
payment
•  Unfair practices in the award of public contracts
EU JHA Third Pillar Matters
(Police and Judicial Cooperation in Penal Matters)
Until now decision-making is by intergovernmental agreements and
member states initiated.
Police Cooperation
•  European Police College
•  Task Force of Chiefs of Police
•  Joint Investigation Teams
•  Europol Convention
•  Europol Drugs Unit
•  Transmission of personal data by Europol
•  Secretariat for the joint supervisory data-protection bodies
•  Keeping public order and securityANDERSON & APAP
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o  Fight against terrorism
o  Fight against terrorism: directory of skills
o  Combating the financing of terrorist groups
o  Exchange of information on movements of groups
o  Prevention and control of hooliganism
o  Security in connection with football matches with an
international dimension
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters
•  Mutual recognition of financial penalties
•  Framework decision on combating racism and xenophobia
•  Mutual recognition of final decisions in criminal matters
•  Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between member states
•  European arrest warrant
•  Joint investigation teams
•  Extradition: simplified procedure
•  Extradition Convention
•  Collaboration with individuals who cooperate with the judicial
process
•  Provisional judicial cooperation unit
•  European Judicial Network
•  European judicial training network
•  Framework for the exchange of liaison magistrates
•  Convention on Driving Disqualifications
•  Crime victims rights
•  Execution of orders freezing assets or evidence
•  Protection of the European Communities’ financial interests: a
convention
•  Protection of the Communities’ financial interests: regulation
•  People responsible for genocide and crimes against humanity:
network of contact points
•  Eurojust
o  Initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany
o  Initiative of Portugal, France, Sweden and Belgium
o  Communication from the Commission on the
establishment of Eurojust
Fight against Organised Crime
•  Crime prevention
o  Comprehensive strategy for combating organised crime
o  Strategy for the prevention & control of organised crime
o  Crime prevention
o  European crime prevention networkFREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
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•  Common reference framework for liaison officers
•  Mechanism for evaluating ways to combat organised crime
•  Identification, tracing and confiscation of instrumentalities and
the proceeds from crime
•  Exchange of DNA analysis results
•  Making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal
organisation in the member states
•  Crime associated with particular routes
•  Convention on Cyber Crime
•  Contact points to combat high-tech crime
•  United Nations convention against organised crime
•  Money laundering
•  Serious environmental crime
•  Protection of the environment through criminal law
Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings
•  Trafficking in human beings, the sexual exploitation of children
and child pornography
•  Council framework against trafficking in human beings
•  Framework decision against the sexual exploitation of children
and child pornography
•  Joint Action to combat trafficking in human beings and sexual
exploitation of children
•  Trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation
•  New measures to combat trafficking in women
•  Combating child sex tourism
•  The implementation of measures to combat child sex tourism
•  Combating child pornography on the Internet
•  Search for missing or sexually exploited children94
ABOUT THE CEPS-SITRA NETWORK
CEPS, with financial assistance of the Finnish SITRA Foundation,
embarked at the end of 2000 on a programme to examine the impact of
Justice and Home Affairs acquis on an enlarged European Union, the
implications for the candidate countries and for the states with which they
share borders. The aim of this programme is to help establish a better
balance between civil liberties and security in an enlarged Europe.
This project will lead to a series of policy recommendations that will
promote cooperation in EU JHA in the context of an enlarged Europe as
well as institutional developments for the medium- to long-term in areas
such as a European Public Prosecutors Office, re-shaping Europol and a
developed system of policing the external frontier (Euro Border Guard).
These must be made within a balanced framework. There are two key
issues:
  First of all, to prevent the distortion of the agenda by “events” – some
items are being accelerated and other marginalised. This risks upsetting
the balance, carefully crafted by the Finnish Presidency, between
freedom, security and justice. The current ‘threat’ is that security issues,
at the expense of the others, will predominate after the catastrophic
events of 11th September. These have resulted in a formidable political
shock, which served as a catalyst to promote certain initiatives on the
political agenda, such as the European arrest warrant, and a common
definition of terrorism. The monitoring of items, which could be
marginalised and the nature of the institutional/political blockages that
could distort the Tampere agenda, is our priority.
  Secondly, how to look beyond the Tampere agenda, both in terms of
providing a flexible approach during the period of completion of the
Tampere programme as well as what should come afterwards. Much
detail remains to be filled in about rigid items on the Tampere agenda and
CEPS will continue to work in three very important areas:
•  Arrangements for managing and policing the external frontier;
•  Judicial co-operation leading to the development of a European
Public Prosecutor; and
•  Strengthening of Europol, particularly in the field of serious trans-
frontier violence and moves towards a more federalised policing
capacity.95
The CEPS-SITRA programme brings together a multi-disciplinary
network of 20 experts drawn from EU member states, applicant countries
as well as neighbouring states: the European University Institute in
Florence, the Stefan Batory Foundation (Warsaw), European Academy of
Law (ERA Trier), Academy of Sciences (Moscow), London School of
Economics, International Office of Migration (Helsinki), Fondation
Nationale des Sciences Politiques (CERI) in France, Universities of
Budapest,  Université  Catholique de  Louvain-la-Neuve, University of
Lisbon ( Autonoma), University of  Nijmegen, University of Burgos,
CEIFO in Stockholm, University of Tilberg and University of Vilnius, as
well as members with practical judicial and legislative backgrounds
A Note about SITRA (Suomen itsenäisyyden juhlarahasto
  Is the Finnish National Fund for Research and Development. It is an
independent public foundation under the supervision of the Finnish
Parliament. The Fund aims to promote Finland’s economic prosperity by
encouraging research, backing innovative projects, organising training
programmes and providing venture capital.